Signaling Discount Rates: Law, Norms, and Economic Methodology by McAdams, Richard H
Book Review
Signaling Discount Rates: Law, Norms, and
Economic Methodology
Richard H. McAdamst
Law and Social Norms. By Eric A. Posner. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2000. Pp. 260. $39.95.
For decades, sociologists and law-and-society scholars have studied law
in a broader social context that includes norms.' More recently, the subject
of social norms has come to the sustained attention of rational choice
scholars, including economists, 2 philosophers,3 political scientists,4 and
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legal theorists. Where the former group of theorists emphasizes the way that
norms and other social forces constrain individual behavior, the latter
theorists seek to explain social norms as the result of the choices individuals
make while (more or less) rationally pursuing their own interests.
5 The
seminal work in the law-and-economics camp is unquestionably Robert
Ellickson's Order Without Law. 6 After its publication, the analysis of norms
exploded. The number of articles using a rational choice framework to
discuss the interaction of law and norms is now too large to list even in a
law review footnote.' Eric Posner's new Law and Social Norms,
8 however,
represents the first book-length treatment of this subject by a law professor
since Ellickson.9
I should disclose at the outset that I am one of the many participants in
this new rational choice take on the old subject of social norms,'
° which
obviously colors my perspective on Posner's book. Several critics of law
and economics have taken to task this scholarly subfield; they have not
liked the new trend to incorporate norms any more than they liked the
"old" law and economics, perhaps even less because it purports to explain
what prior scholarship merely ignored." Posner's work will undoubtedly
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attract this kind of criticism, but not from me. I accept the notion that we
can gain some purchase on the difficult subject of norms by looking for the
individual interests in creating, following, and enforcing norms. My
scholarly perspective is focused more on how, rather than whether, to use
rational choice theory to explain norms.
Posner's explanation for the behavior we would label adherence to
norms is audacious and original. For the most part, he locates the source of
norms in individuals' need to convince others that they will be good
cooperative partners. Individuals need to "signal" that they value the future
sufficiently-have a low enough "discount rate" -to forego the immediate
benefits of defecting or cheating for the deferred benefits of a sustained
cooperative relationship. The departure from earlier work within law and
economics is to set aside internalized values and other normative
motivations, rather than to wrestle them somehow into the framework. 2
Posner then uses his theory to analyze an amazing number of topics:
manners, fashion, gift-giving, marriage, conspicuous consumption, voting,
race discrimination, and nationalism-from why people obey law to why
they bother to make contracts legally enforceable, from the sources of
group loyalty to the requirements for individual autonomy. The subject of
norms is a big one, and this book attempts to cover a lot of it.
For those seeking an early bottom line, it is this: Law and Social Norms
succeeds well in individual contributions to the many topics it covers, but
less well in the construction of a broad theory of norms. Those interested in
these topics will benefit from the precise way that Posner states the relevant
theoretical issues and the creative approach he takes to resolving them, even
if one does not always agree with the resolution. But the value often comes
directly from Posner's thinking about the specific issue rather than from
applying his conceptual apparatus-the discount-rate signaling theory of
social norms. In my view, this model exaggerates the importance of the
motivation and mechanisms it employs and understates the importance of
the normative origins of norms.
1998 Wisc. L. REv. 579. For more general criticisms of the rational choice approach, see
DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: A CRITIQUE
OF APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE (1994); and Martha C. Nussbaum, Flawed Foundations:
The Philosophical Critique of (a Particular Type of) Economics, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1197 (1997).
12. For example, Robert Cooter offers a rational choice account of norm internalization. E.g.,
Robert Cooter, Models of Morality in Law and Economics: Self-Control and Self-Improvement for
the "Bad Man" of Holmes, 78 B.U. L. REV. 903 (1998). Peter Huang and Ho-Mou Wu emphasize
the emotion of remorse to explain norms. Peter Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, More Order Without More
Law: A Theory of Social Norms and Organizational Cultures, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 390 (1994).
I have argued that norms arise from the selfish and rational pursuit of esteem; that is, because
people value the approval of others intrinsically, patterns of normative judgment tend to produce
corresponding patterns of behavior. McAdams, supra note 10. For further comparisons of this
work to Posner's, see infra text accompanying notes 187-189.
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My Review proceeds in four parts. Part I describes Posner's discount-
rate signaling model of norms, as well as a supplemental "commitment"
model he uses. Part II raises a concern about the falsifiability of the general
model and then describes and critiques a few of his many substantive
applications. The falsifiability problem arises because the abstract model
puts so much weight on an unexplained and unconstrained process by
which "norm entrepreneurs" create new norms. The problem infects some
but not all of Posner's analysis of particular concrete norms. To illustrate, I
explain what is powerful about his explanation of gift-giving and family
norms, but also what is unpersuasive in his discussion of conspicuous
consumption and norms of race discrimination. Part III then critiques
Posner's theory more broadly. I suggest a more complex way of
understanding discount rates and raise some doubts about the core inference
from a person's discount rate to his or her suitability for cooperation. I then
describe some improbable implications of the signaling model of norms,
such as that there is less norm compliance among the aged and in groups
with smaller and more stable membership, and that people would never
volunteer information that implies a high discount rate. I conclude by
questioning whether people would invest so much in signaling given better
alternatives for attracting cooperative partners. Part IV then critiques
Posner's reductionist methodology: his provocative choice to explain norms
without relying on any sort of normative motivation.
I. SIGNALING DISCOUNT RATES AND PRODUCING NORMS
For Posner, as for many rational choice theorists, the starting point for
discussing norms is the familiar problem of cooperation, in which
individuals fail to achieve all possible cooperative gains because each has a
"dominant" strategy of defection. The standard example is the prisoner's
dilemma, in which each prisoner does better by confessing no matter what
the other prisoner does.13 Posner's analysis employs the repeated version of
the game. As Robert Axelrod illustrated in his famous computer
tournaments, when the prisoner's dilemma game is repeated, and if the
parties value the future sufficiently, conditionally cooperative strategies
13. In the famous example, two prisoners, A and B, are suspected of committing a crime
together. If neither confesses, each knows they will each be convicted of a lesser offense and
serve (say) three years in prison. The prosecutor then offers each the following deal, and each
knows it is offered to the other: If you confess and the other does not, we will let you off with
only one year in prison; if the other confesses and you do not, we will punish you with ten years in
prison; if you both confess, you both will serve five years in prison. Confessing is the dominant
strategy because it is the best strategy no matter what the other prisoner does. From A's
perspective, if B confesses, A is better off confessing and getting five years instead of ten; if B
does not confess, A is better off confessing and getting one year instead of three. The reasoning is
the same for B.
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may thrive. 4 The incentive to defect is no longer dominant because
defection may provoke the other side into defecting in future rounds,
whereas cooperating may induce cooperation. If the parties care enough
about the future, the discounted benefit from mutual cooperation in future
rounds will exceed the immediate benefit from defecting. This does not
mean that always cooperating is the dominant strategy because that strategy
is easily exploited by strategies that always defect. Even conditional
cooperation like the tit-for-tat strategy that won the Axelrod tournament is
not dominant. 15 But the well-established result is that repetition of the game
makes cooperation possible; sustained conditional cooperation is one
possible equilibrium for the repeated game.
A. Signaling and Social Norms
As indicated, a key variable determining the possibility and likelihood
of cooperation is the individual's discount rate. The more one discounts the
future, the less likely one is to forego the immediate and one-time benefit of
defecting in favor of the delayed benefit of future cooperation. Thus, in the
repeat game, individuals may differ in their degree of cooperation just
because they differ in the amount they value the future. Facing the same
payoffs, individuals with a high discount rate-whom Posner calls a "bad
type" -may always defect, while those with a low discount rate-" good
types"-employ some strategy of conditional cooperation.1 6 In Posner's
model, the differences in the willingness of individuals to cooperate, and
the attendant labels of "good" and "bad" types, are based on nothing but a
difference in the individuals' discount rates. 7
All of which reasonably leads Posner to make these twin inferences:
Part of the effort to find cooperative partners is an effort to find individuals
with low discount rates; part of the effort to attract cooperative partners is
an effort to convince others that one has a low discount rate. A good type"
who plans to cooperate will prefer interacting with another good type; the
two stand the greatest chance of achieving repeated cooperation. A bad type
planning to defect will seek out good types because the immediate payoffs
14. ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 27-54 (1984).
15. For example, if other players always defect, then one who plays any conditional strategy
that cooperates in the first round will always do worse than others in that round. Though a
conditional cooperator may achieve an equal outcome in future rounds, when both players defect,
the conditional cooperator never recovers from doing worse in the first round.
16. POSNER, supra note 8, at 18.
17. Posner mentions in passing other characteristics that might separate individuals into
"good" and "bad" types for cooperative relationships, but does not develop these ideas, stating
they can all be "collapsed into the definition of the discount rate." Id.
18. From this point on, I drop the quotes around "good" and "bad" type, but I note again
that Posner uses these terms in a narrow, technical, and nonnormative manner. Good and bad
types are equally selfish; neither is driven by fairness or commitment to moral principle.
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from defecting are higher if the other cooperates. Thus, everyone will seek
individuals with low discount rates. As a result, the individual who
convinces others that she has a low discount rate will be offered more
cooperative opportunities, while one who imprudently convinces others of
her high discount rate will encounter fewer opportunities. 9 It pays to appear
to take the long view.
How does one convince others that one has a low discount rate? That is
the story of the book. Before reading Law and Social Norms, one might
have thought there were a limited number of things one could do to
influence what others think of one's discount rate. Not so. Posner claims
that a huge amount of social life consists of the effort individuals give to
projecting a low discount rate. The behaviors by which people project a
discount rate are called "signals." In game theory, a person who has private
and nonverifiable information can "signal" that information (intentionally
or not) by making certain strategy choices.20 In particular, people with low
discount rates are more willing than others to incur a short-term cost for the
sake of future cooperative gains. For this reason, Posner says, any costly
and observable behavior can serve as a signal that one has a relatively low
discount rate.21
For an example, I turn to the first application chapter, on gift-giving.
Other things equal, a good type is willing to incur a greater cost from giving
a gift at the beginning of a relationship. The less one discounts the future
benefits of the relationship, the more one is willing to spend up front to
signal one's low discount rate as a means of creating the relationship. Thus,
gift-giving is a signal of low discount rates. For example, suppose "a good
type values a future payoff of 10 [from some kind of future cooperation] at
a 10 percent discount and a bad type values the same payoff at a 30 percent
discount."22 This means that the good type "can distinguish himself' by
buying a gift that costs 8.23 This cost "is less than the good type's
discounted payoff (9) and greater than the bad type's discounted payoff
(7)." 24 Because only good types are willing to incur the cost of bestowing
the gift, they will use the behavior to signal their type and attract
cooperative opportunities.
Gift-giving is but one example of the signaling model. Any behavior
that is costly (in the sense of having a positive cost, no matter how small)
can serve in the same manner to distinguish good and bad types. All that is
19. Id. at 19.
20. Signals are "[s]trategy choices by those who possess nonveriflable information that
convey information." DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 315 (1994).
21. POSNER, supra note 8, at 24 ("[A]ny costly action can be a signal .... "); id. at 25
(" [A]nything can be a signal.").





necessary is that the cost of the behavior be apparent to observers. Thus,
Posner briefly suggests that manners and fashion-how one holds a fork or
styles one's hair-are signals of one's discount rate.' These behaviors are
costly, which means that, other things equal, good types will be more
willing to invest in them than bad types. They are observable, which means
others will receive the signal. And manners and fashion are arbitrary, which
is useful because people are more likely to infer that conformity reflects a
low discount rate rather than an intrinsic preference to behave in the
particular manner.
Thus, the requirements for signaling are minimal. Because most
behaviors are costly and potentially public (in that they have a chance of
being discovered by others), and any can be made to include some arbitrary
aspects, the theory of signaling discount rates has potential application to
virtually any possible behavioral regularity. I discuss more of Posner's
applications below, but a partial list of the behaviors he models as signals of
discount rates provides a sense of the breadth of the analysis: engagement
rings, 6 deferred sex and unprotected sex," obedience to law,2 voting,29
patriotic displays,3°  self-censorship," race discrimination,32  and
nationalism.33 One might imagine that this theory explains too much, an
objection that Posner anticipates but one to which I return in several places.
At this point, however, one may ask: What does signaling have to do
with social norms, the subject promised in half the title? Here we see the
full breadth of Posner's claim. Posner asserts that the behavioral regularities
we call social norms are merely the equilibrium outcomes of various
signaling games. Some background on signaling equilibria is useful to
illuminate Posner's point. There are two principal types of signaling
equilibria. When individuals attempt to signal their type, perhaps the most
intuitive outcome is a separating equilibrium. In the above numerical
example, the good type is willing to give a gift of 8 to secure a future
relationship he values at 9 (discounted from a future value of 10). Because
the bad type's discount rate is higher, he will not give the gift. Thus, in
equilibrium, the signal separates the good and bad types because only the
former engage in the behavioral regularity the signal represents. Suppose,
however, that potential gifts are discontinuous and that one can make gifts
costing only either 5 or 10. In that case, the signal of gift-giving cannot
25. Id. at 22.
26. Id. at71.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 111.
29. Id. at 122-25.
30. Id. at 113-19.
31. Id. at 119-22.
32. Id. at 133-43.
33. Id. at 143-47.
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distinguish the types. Neither the good nor the bad type is willing to give a
gift of 10, but both are willing to give a gift of 5. There are two possible
pooling equilibria: 'where neither type gives any gift or where both types
give gifts of 5.34
There are other potential equilibria to a signaling game, but now
Posner's claim is understandable: The behavioral regularity called a social
norm is merely the equilibrium outcome of a signaling game. When
individuals rationally pursue their own interests in sending signals, they
sometimes produce a pooling equilibrium, in which everyone engages in a
given behavior to avoid signaling a high discount rate. Other times, the
signaling game produces a separating equilibrium, in which a large part of
society-the majority, if the majority of society consists of good types-
engages in the behavior but a substantial portion do not. In either case,
Posner repeatedly emphasizes that the "norm" is merely the result of these
processes; the norm does not cause behavior but is rather the label we
attach to the regularity caused by the incentives of the signaling game."
Quite the opposite of Jon Elster's puissant statement that norms "have a
grip on the mind," 3 6 Posner proposes that "social norms are endogenous in
games in which people maximize their interests through cooperation. They
do not exist independently of people's interests, beliefs, and behavior."37
B. The Role of Norm Entrepreneurs
There is another major piece to the signaling model-a " norm
entrepreneur."38 Before explaining what the entrepreneur is or does, it
would be useful to understand why this additional component is necessary
to Posner's model. Understanding its function requires that I introduce a
distinction not drawn by Posner but implicit in his analysis. Let us say that
a behavior "distinguishes" good and bad types if it is more common to one
type than to the other. Some behaviors can distinguish good and bad types
before those behaviors are recognized by anyone as signals (of a low
34. The latter might seem unlikely. But imagine what might happen if good types lack
sufficient information to foresee that they cannot reach a separating equilibrium. Attempting to
signal their low discount rates, good types provide gifts. Bad types then emulate good types. Once
everyone gives that gift, everyone fears abandoning the behavior because it might be taken as a
sign of a high discount rate.
35. POSNER, supra note 8, at 8 ("The claim that a social norm caused X or Y is an empty
claim. The appropriate claim is 'individuals seeking a or b interacted in such a way as to produce
behavioral regularities X or Y, regularities that we call 'social norms."').
36. JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY: A STUDY OF SOCIAL ORDER 100 (1989)
(emphasis omitted).
37. POSNER, supra note 8, at 78; see also id. at 26 ("What we call a social norm.., is simply
a description of the behavior that emerges in these signaling equilibriums. In this model the social
norm has no independent power, it is not an exogenous force, it is not internalized.").
38. Id. at 29-32.
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discount rate or anything else), while other behaviors will distinguish types
only after the behaviors are recognized as signals. A crucial move that
Posner makes is extending the analysis to the latter cases, a move that turns
out to produce the most interesting but also most disputable results.
To illustrate the former category-where behavioral differences predate
signaling-consider savings and education. People with low discount rates
save more and invest more in education than people with high discount
rates because savings and education are activities in which the costs are
entirely or mostly immediate, while the benefits are entirely or mostly
deferred. Valuing the future more, they will be more inclined to bear
present costs in exchange for future benefits. Thus, even if there were no
signaling benefit (imagine everyone simply knew everyone else's discount
rate, so there was no private information to signal), good types would
distinguish themselves by savings and education. Further, independent of
any signaling benefit, good types would avoid tardiness and addiction more
than bad types. People who value the future more will value planning for
the future more, which will cause them to be on time more often. And
people who value the future more will value the costs of addiction more,
which will cause them to refrain more often from consumption that will
produce future costs.39
Let us call distinctions between good and bad types "natural" if, like
the above examples, they do not depend on the behavior serving as a signal.
The key point about these natural distinctions is that it is easy to explain
how they become signals. A signal requires that "everyone, or most people,
believe that certain behaviors serve as signals." ' To create these beliefs for
natural distinctions, people need only to perceive the existing distinction;
they need only to perceive the correlation between a person's type and, for
example, the person's level of education, savings, tardiness, or addiction.
Once most people recognize that those with greater education and fewer
addictions are more likely to cooperate in repeat prisoner's dilemmas, these
behaviors become signals. As a result, good and bad types will invest even
more in obtaining education and avoiding addiction, but the good types may
be able to distinguish themselves by outpacing the bad types' investment.
For the most part, however, Posner is not interested in these natural
distinctions between good and bad types. They do not give rise to the
specific norms he wants to explain. Instead, he seeks to use signaling to
explain behaviors that can distinguish good and bad types only after they
39. Posner mentions a few such distinctions: "Good types also signal by being business-like,
in contrast to bad types, who fail to plan, are poorly organized, are chronically late, and are likely
to be obese or to be addicted to alcohol or drugs." Id. at 21. Elsewhere he says bad types "do not
want friends as much as good types do, because friendship requires immediate and significant
investment in return for an uncertain long-term gain." Id. at 65. Thus, another natural signal of
good types is having many friends.
40. Id. at 31 (emphasis added).
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are recognized as signals. He is interested, in other words, in "arbitrary"
signals.41 For example, he mentions manners and fashion, but good types
would not be more likely than bad types to hold their fork a particular way
42
or part their hair on a particular side4 3 unless these behaviors are already
recognized as signals. The same is true of all the behaviors Posner
considers. Absent signaling, good types would not be more likely than bad
types to give engagement rings,' racially discriminate,4 5 engage in patriotic
displays,' shun criminals,47 or vote in political elections.48 But if good types
are not initially more likely to engage in these behaviors than bad types,
how do they ever become recognized as signals of the good type? The
problem is acute because Posner tells us that any costly observable behavior
can be a signal. So how does everyone (or nearly everyone) first come to
believe that one arbitrary behavior, out of an infinite number of possible
arbitrary behaviors, is a signal of a low discount rate?
To solve this coordination problem, Posner introduces the norm
entrepreneur. Although it is possible that "[h]istorical coincidence, physical
qualities, and mere deviation from statistical regularities" might provide a
"focal point" of certain behavior,4 9 creating a signal that everyone
recognizes, Posner emphasizes individuals who attempt to influence
behavior intentionally:
[I]t is useful to imagine the cooperation game embedded in a larger
game. Prior to the first move of the cooperation game, a "norm
entrepreneur" announces that a particular action will be a signal.
(In real life, many norm entrepreneurs compete by proposing
different signals.) The norm entrepreneur states that a particular
action, for example, attending a public ceremony, will be
understood as a signal of cooperativeness.... Every person, in his
capacity as a sender of signals, chooses among all possible actions
that might serve as signals.... After the cooperation game is
41. See id. at 37 (" [Wihat might emerge as a conventional signal in any group is to a certain
extent arbitrary." ).
42. Id. at 22-23.
43. Id. at 24-25.
44. Id. at 71.
45. Id. at 133-43.
46. Id. at 113-19.
47. Id. at 90.
48. Id. at 122-25. Absent signaling, good types should not engage in any of these behaviors
more than bad types because, by hypothesis, the two types differ only by their discount rates.
49. Id. at 30. Thomas Schelling was the first to explore how certain psychologically
prominent or salient solutions that he called "focal points" help individuals coordinate in games
with multiple equilibria. THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960); see also
Robert Sugden, A Theory of Focal Points, 105 ECON. J. 533 (1995) (explaining how actors use
labeling to achieve systematic coordination). Posner does not, however, spend much time
discussing focal points as a source of signaling equilibria.
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played, the norm entrepreneur receives a payoff that is a function of
the number of people who issue the signal that he recommends."
Among others, Posner has in mind "[a]rbiters of taste," "sellers of
commercial goods," consultants, "protocol experts," academics,
journalists, politicians, and political activists.5  Norm entrepreneurs
constantly compete to change what the public accepts as signals of low
discount rates.
I hold my criticisms mostly until later, but I must note now that some
further elaboration of this crucial but abstract concept would have proved
helpful. Posner ignores, for example, an apparent tension in the motives of
norm entrepreneurs and the good types they are supposed to persuade. If, as
Posner states, an entrepreneur's payoffs depend on the number of people
who adopt the recommended signal, then the entrepreneur should want to
create a pooling equilibrium in which everyone, even bad types, follows his
or her lead. A commercial vendor or academic, for example, might gain the
most money or prestige by convincing everyone to "issue the signal that he
recommends."52 Yet good types always want a separating equilibrium,
which uniquely distinguishes people and allows good types to avoid bad
types. Why then do good types pay any attention to norm entrepreneurs?
Why not ignore them, because entrepreneurs always advocate signals that
lead to costly pooling equilibria with no offsetting benefit for good types?
Perhaps the answer is that entrepreneurs, preferring to produce a separating
equilibrium rather than none at all, strive for a reputation at providing
signals that produce such equilibria.
But this answer gives rise to another problem: If entrepreneurs must
overcome the skepticism of good types by signaling their commitment to a
separating equilibrium, then it seems important for them to proclaim that
their proposed behavior will have exactly that effect. Their rhetorical appeal
should therefore take the form "Do X because' bad types won't." At the
least, entrepreneurs should reassure others that everyone will not follow
their lead. But I cannot think of many norm entrepreneurs who send this
sort of message.53 To the contrary, entrepreneurs frequently or even
typically advocate and invoke the ideal of universal norm compliance,
which should threaten a pooling equilibrium, undermine their credibility,
and eliminate their persuasive power.54 There may be a simple explanation
50. POSNER, supra note 8, at 30 (citation omitted).
51. Id. at 31-32.
52. Id. at 30.
53. An example is the advertising of expensive status goods, where the implicit message is
that only the wealthy (or those with "refined" tastes) can afford the good.
54. Those who advocate voting do not say "Vote because defectors never will," but "Vote
because it is every citizen's duty," invoking the ideal of universal political participation. Perhaps
everyone believes by now that we will never reach a pooling equilibrium in which everyone votes,
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that squares the signaling theory with this rhetorical practice, but Posner
does not provide one.
C. Some Important Extensions for Explaining Norms
Although the major components are in place, I should describe two
other features of Posner's analysis that are essential to explaining some
important norm characteristics. The first concerns third-party norm
enforcement. Posner says individuals enforce norms to send signals of their
low discount rates. The second concerns conflicting group norms. Posner
introduces a model other than signaling-the commitment model-to
explain why group norms often conflict.
1. Third-Party Enforcement of Norms
Social theorists generally claim that norms are informally enforced by
third parties using sanctions such as negative gossip, direct rebuke,
ostracism, property destruction, and physical violence. Robert Ellickson
observes that sometimes the "best. evidence" of a norm is the existence of
such enforcement.55 Yet the signaling model does not obviously predict
these sanctions. The only sanction the model seems to explain is economic
and social ostracism. If A violates a norm, others infer that A has a high
discount rate; because A is a bad type for cooperation, others will seek to
avoid entering cooperative ventures with him. But the theory does not
predict any other enforcement action against A. On the surface, then, the
model fails to explain why anyone would bear the cost to gossip about or
rebuke A, destroy his property, or commit an assault. Given how central
these acts are to norms, this would seem to be a serious omission in
signaling theory.
But Posner offers a signaling explanation of third-party enforcement
other than ostracism. He claims that these punishing behaviors-gossip,
rebuke, destruction, and violence-are themselves signals for a low
discount rate. They arise in his model because some norm entrepreneur
successfully proposes them as a signal.5 6 Given some behavioral regularity,
an entrepreneur can propose as a signal the costly punishment of those who
deviate from the regularity. The initial behavioral regularity might itself
arise from signaling, or it might arise by statistical accident. In the first
case, an entrepreneur initially advocates behavior X as a signal and, when
so the universal rhetoric is empty and nonthreatening. But it would help if Posner could produce at
least a historic example in which an entrepreneur advocated voting (or some other behavior)
because it would distinguish bad types.
55. ELLICKSON, supra note 6, at 130.
56. POSNER, supra note 8, at 89-90.
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most people start to conform to X, then advocates the punishment of
nonconformers as a signal. In the second case, the regularity is merely
statistical and the norm entrepreneur's role is limited to advocating the
punishment of those who deviate from the regularity.
Posner illustrates the latter idea of exploiting existing differences with
the example of sex-specific hairstyles among children:
We might imagine that at time 0, most male and female
schoolchildren in some classroom just happened to part their hair
on opposite sides of the head, but no moral significance was
attached to this practice. At time 1, an entrepreneurial kid shows
the others that he is a good type because he is able to incur the cost
of rejecting a child whose hair deviated from the male norm.57
Later, he discusses how this sort of entrepreneurism may lead to and
explain punishing behavior beyond ostracism, as with informing during
McCarthyism," the harassment and physical assaults known as
"charivari," " and physical assaults and lynching to enforce norms of racial
discrimination.60
2. Group Loyalty and Group Norms: The Supplemental
Commitment Model
Signaling can easily explain conflict between norms when the norms
exist in different places: Any arbitrary (costly and observable) behavior will
suffice, so there is no reason to expect the signal in one location, produced
by one norm entrepreneur, to be the same as the signal in another location,
produced by a different entrepreneur. But signaling cannot so easily explain
how different norms arise in the same place. Among people who are close
enough to interact with one another, everyone should know that a certain
behavior is viewed by others as the discount-rate signal, and everyone
should want to send that signal to acquire cooperative opportunities. Yet
norms do conflict even in the same place. They conflict when different
groups-often a dominant group and various subgroups-live in the same
town or city. Indeed, the norms of one group often require a behavior that
another group's norms forbid; sometimes the whole purpose is to violate
another group's norm.
To explain this sort of phenomenon, Posner sketches a second model of
social norms, also arising from the struggle to find cooperative partners in
the repeat prisoner's dilemma game. In the "commitment model," an
57. Id. at 25.
58. Id. at 114.
59. Id. at 76-78.
60. Id. at 77, 138.
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individual shows his "loyalty" to members of a nonmainstream social
group "by ostentatiously violating the norms of a dominant group." 6' By
violating the dominant group's norms, an individual cuts himself off from
cooperation with that group. Because an individual has fewer outside
options, he is more dependent on maintaining a cooperative relationship
with those in his particular subgroup. So, an individual will burn his bridges
with the dominant group to make himself unlikely to cheat anyone in his
own subgroup.62
Posner says that this model is independent of the signaling model;
"[tihe incentives here are different." 63 He explains:
Teenagers and others who reject mainstream society violate
conventional forms of behavior not because they do not care about
future payoffs, but because they seek future payoffs from people
outside mainstream society. Those who observe these violations
refuse to cooperate with this group of people because they believe
that they are unreliable, but their unreliability is a result not of their
discount rate but of the contempt they hold for the observers.'
To illustrate: A teenager adopts a distinctive manner of dress, hairstyle, and
body-piercing because it offends adult sensibilities and thereby limits his
cooperative options to other teens who are not offended. As a result of
having fewer outside options, the teen has more at stake in preserving his
reputation among teens and therefore is a more attractive cooperative
partner for them.
Note that there is a tension between the signaling and commitment
models, though not one Posner discusses. The motive for the teen-or any
out-group member-to reject the dominant, in-group norms is to capture
future payoffs from cooperating with other teens. Although dominant-group
members obey group norms to signal a low discount rate, the behavior
Posner describes also looks like a way of signaling low discount rates: Only
an individual who values the future greatly would bother to engage in the
costly behavior-rejecting dominant-group values-in order to secure
better cooperative relations in the future. Thus, even from members of the
dominant group, the demonstration that one values the future should attract
rather than repel cooperative overtures. 65
61. Id. at 28-29.
62. Id. at 29.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. This suggests the possible absence of an equilibrium: At time 1, deviant behavior by
subgroup members seems to signal the bad type and repels cooperative partners from the
dominant group. At time 2, members of the dominant group realize that the deviant behavior is
intentional, aimed at securing cooperation from subgroup members. Because this is future-
oriented action, the deviant behavior now attracts cooperation from members of the dominant
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Posner seeks to avoid this problem by saying that the out-group
members repel cooperation from members of the dominant group for
reasons unrelated to their discount rates. Out-group members demonstrate
their unreliability as cooperative partners with members of the dominant
group by showing "the contempt they hold for the observers." 66 The surly
teen with a pierced nose reveals that he is unwilling or possibly unable to
cooperate with those who conform to mainstream values. But Posner's
model of human behavior is so spare, it is not clear how it includes the
ability to feel contempt for someone else or to feel someone else's
contempt. Contempt is an emotion, and it is not clear how Posner can let in
this bit of emotion without letting in a whole lot more. I address this sort of
problem below.
II. THE FALSIFIABILITY PROBLEM AND APPLICATIONS OF THE
SIGNALING MODEL
Most of Law and Social Norms is devoted to six chapters applying the
model to various social norms and legal topics and to three chapters
exploring the normative implications of the model. The breadth of these
chapters is remarkable. The substantive applications are not narrowly tied
to the signaling model but combine it with other insights to provide
interesting theories of gratuitous promises, family law, shame sanctions and
criminal law, voting and political participation, racial discrimination and
nationalism, and contract law. The final chapters provide an extended
discussion of the efficiency of norms, a signaling analysis of the problem of
stigma in the distribution of welfare benefits, a signaling analysis of
incommensurability in popular discourse, and, at the end, a discussion of
signaling and social norms from the perspective of autonomy theory, a
dramatic shift from the utilitarian tone of the rest of the book.67 Anyone
interested in these topics will find great insights and much to wrestle with
in these chapters.
The application chapters are important not only because they provide
the payoff for the signaling theory: the explanations of specific norms and
how law interacts with them. These chapters also reveal how the signaling
group. At time 3, however, dominant-group members observe that deviancy is no longer costly,
because it attracts cooperative partners. Fearing that deviancy now signals the bad type, dominant-
group members switch back to avoiding the deviants. The cycle continues back to what it was at
time 1.
66. POSNER, supra note 8, at 29.
67. Most of the book is a positive account of norms, but where Posner provides a normative
evaluation, he uses economic ideas of efficiency, until this last chapter on autonomy. Autonomy
theory places value on the capability or opportunity to exercise human choice rather than the
satisfaction of preferences. See, e.g., GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
AUTONOMY (1988); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (2000);
JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986).
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theory can be usefully constrained to generate specific and falsifiable
results. I say this because the abstract theory has so many degrees of
freedom, especially given the unconstrained role of norm entrepreneurs. In
this Part, I briefly describe this falsifiability problem and then discuss some
of Posner' s particular applications.
A. The Falsifiability of the General Signaling Theory
To test a theory's strength, we must be able to use the theory to
generate concrete predictions, the accuracy of which we can then measure
empirically. One weakness of signaling models generally is the difficulty of
constraining them to make specific predictions. The same is true of
Posner's theory. Recall that he emphasizes arbitrary, rather than natural,
signals. As a result, "any costly [and observable] action can be a signal" of
discount rates.68 This is meant literally. At one point, Posner offers to
explain why "[b]urning money and running around in circles" are not
signals. 69 The only reason he gives is the intentionally circular one that
most people do not engage in these behaviors, which makes them
unfamiliar and difficult to evaluate as signals.7" In other words, burning
money and running around in circles could be signals. They have the right
"cost structure"71 and would become signals if a norm entrepreneur were to
succeed in advocating them as such. It is simply that no entrepreneur has
succeeded. The only constraint on the abstract theory is, therefore, the
success of norm entrepreneurs.72
Unfortunately, Posner offers no basis to predict when entrepreneurs
will succeed or fail. He does not even offer preliminary remarks on the
matter. Thus, if we ask why certain norms exist and not others-like
burning money-the answer is ultimately that, for reasons unknown, norm
entrepreneurs succeeded in making certain behaviors familiar as signals of
discount rates but failed (so far) in making other behaviors signals. The
flexibility of an arbitrary signaling model appears to make it impossible to
68. POSNER, supra note 8, at 24 (emphasis added); see also id. ("If this claim seems too
strong, try to think of a kind of behavior that is truly arbitrary, and chances are that somewhere
that behavior has become a signal.").
69. Id. at 155.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Or of "focal points," which sometimes allow individuals to identify a behavior as a
signal without a coordinating norm entrepreneur. But everything stated in the text about norm
entrepreneurs applies equally to focal points. The conditions necessary to make an equilibrium
"focal" are notoriously open-ended. See SCHELLING, supra note 49, at 97 (stating that
coordinating via a focal point "may depend more on imagination than on logic, more on poetry or
humor than on mathematics"); Robert Sugden, The Role of Inductive Reasoning in the Evolution
of Conventions, 17 LAW & PHIL. 377 (1998). They depend on factors including, in Posner's
words, "coincidence" and "serendipity." POSNER, supra note 8, at 30.
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use the theory to make concrete predictions about what norms will or will
not exist in a society.
This predictive difficulty leads to a more general problem for
economics. Because it is difficult to measure the returns to signaling, the
theory makes it difficult for economics to distinguish between ultimately
costly and ultimately beneficial behavior. For example, consider what
Posner says about voting. Much has been written about the rational choice
paradox of voting.73 If people are selfish and rational, why would they incur
any costs to vote when they have virtually no chance of affecting the
outcome? Posner explains voting as just another costly behavior that signals
a low discount rate.74 He states: "This explanation turns the voting paradox
on its head: [Vioting functions as a signal precisely because the costs
exceed the material gains." 75 Of course, if the full costs exceeded the full
benefits, no one would vote. What Posner means is that, setting aside the
signaling benefits, voting is costly. Because voting is costly, it can create
signaling benefits. Because those signaling benefits (combined with any
other benefits) exceed the costs of voting, people vote.
But the problem is that Posner makes this sort of claim without actually
measuring the signaling returns to voting. In this respect, signaling theory
threatens to make every behavior consistent with economic theory. Without
signaling, it is usually possible to identify and measure when people are
making "investments" -incurring costs-because they expect to receive
greater returns. But with discount-rate signaling, any costly behavior is
potentially an investment. If people refrain from costly behavior X, we say
they are maximizing their utility by avoiding costs. But if people routinely
engage in costly behavior X, we can now say that they are signaling their
low discount rate and producing a net gain. Arbitrary signaling theory thus
threatens to turn all of economics on its head.
This problem would not arise if we measured the returns to signaling
precisely, because we could then rule out signaling claims when the
measured returns were less than the measured costs. Nor would the problem
exist if we knew that norm entrepreneurs could succeed only under certain
measurable conditions, because we would then constrain the theory to the
situations where those conditions exist. But neither empirical task is
particularly tractable. Posner does not attempt to measure the returns to
signaling or to explain how to measure them. And, as stated above, Posner
says nothing about what makes norm entrepreneurs fail or succeed.
Of course, Posner is astute enough to anticipate this concern. As one
response, he says that we can test the signaling model by finding out if
73. E.g., GREEN & SHAPIRO, supra note 11, at 47-71; Richard L. Hasen, Voting Without
Law?, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2135, 2138-46 (1996).
74. POSNER, supra note 8, at 122-25.
75. Id. at 123.
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people with low discount rates comply with norms more than do people
with high discount rates. If we find that those with high discount rates
comply more than or as much as those with low discount rates, the model
would be falsified.76 This is true enough; however, on nearly any rational
choice theory of norms I can imagine, people who value the future more
will, other things being equal, obey norms (or appear to obey them) more
than people who value the future less. For a rational choice theory, the
structure of norm compliance is that one bears costs today by complying
with the norm and thereby avoids greater costs in the future-the costs of
incurring norm sanctions (whatever they may be). Because the sanctions are
deferred, we would always expect future-oriented people to comply more.77
Consequently, if we find that people with lower discount rates do not
comply more, we have probably falsified any rational choice approach to
norms. Conversely, finding the expected relationship, while not
disconfirming Posner's specific theory, would not provide much in the way
of specific confirmation either.
Nonetheless, I believe that the discount-rate signaling model does
generate some unique predictions about the structure and content of norms.
I examine below some of these implications.7" Unfortunately for the model,
however, I find the implications to be mostly implausible, cutting against
rather than in favor of Posner's model.
Note, however, that my discussion thus far has occurred at a rather
abstract level. Yet one could doubt the usefulness of discount-rate signaling
as a general norms theory and still embrace it as an explanation of
particular norms. The proof of the pudding, they say, is in the eating.
Putting aside tests of the abstract theory, if Posner can show that signaling
explains tightly a number of interesting behaviors, then the theory works. I
think Posner sometimes succeeds and sometimes does not. Rather than
describe all of his applications in detail, however, I focus on a few
representative examples: gift-giving, probably the most powerful
application; family norms, which illustrate some of Posner's general
76. Id. at 36-38. He briefly describes how one might go about conducting the test. To
measure individual discount rates, Posner identifies the sort of behaviors that I said above would
"naturally" distinguish people according to the degree they value the future: "not having a
savings account; smoking; having sex without contraception; being at a young age when one first
smoked, drank or had sex; being poor; being less educated; and being younger." Id. at 36-37
(citations omitted). Posner admits that measuring norm compliance is difficult because norms vary
according to group, and sometimes the same behavior is a norm for one person but a way of
satisfying tastes for another. Id. at 37-38.
77. Moreover, sometimes compliance requires planning: remembering to make time to vote,
buying a gift before the requisite occasion, and so forth. Those with a higher discount rate are less
likely to prepare for compliance. Offsetting these two factors is the possibility that people with
low discount rates will be better at concealing their norm violations. See infra text accompanying
notes 143-146. Although that might mean that individuals who value the future commit more
norm violations, it would still mean we would continue to observe fewer violations.
78. See infra text accompanying notes 147-165.
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themes; conspicuous consumption, one of the weaker applications; and race
discrimination, a subject about which there is already much existing
theory.7 9 The first two examples, I believe, are much more successful than
the last two.
B. Application of the Model to Specific Norms
Gifts. Perhaps the most powerful application is the one already alluded
to: the analysis of gift-giving. A wishes to enter a cooperative relationship
with B, but B is not sure about whether to trust A. A might be interested in
long-term cooperation or might seek the relationship merely for the
opportunity to defect immediately (after which we imagine that B protects
himself by defecting in future rounds or by terminating the relationship). In
this context, A gives B a gift as a sign of "good faith." Why does the gift
demonstrate A's intent to cooperate? Because someone planning to cheat
will not give a gift of a given cost. In the example above,8 the bad type is
not willing to give a gift that costs 8, but the good type is.
What if A and B are both unsure whether to trust one another? Mutual
uncertainty implies that each will need to bestow a gift on the other, but this
creates a problem. If they each give a gift that each values at 8, then their
gifts offset one another. Even if A is planning to cheat, he would gladly give
a gift of 8 in exchange for a gift of 8. It is the same as making no gift at all.
This leads Posner to an interesting result: "Reciprocal gift-giving requires
the destruction of value." 8 For A and B to signal their cooperative intent
through gifts, they must each give a gift that costs the donor more than it
benefits the donee. In this numerical example, the cost of each gift must
exceed the benefit by 8. For example, A and B could each buy a gift for 10
that the other values at only 2. As a result, the exchange imposes on each a
net cost of 8, which is something only one intending to cooperate would do.
The signaling theory thus explains not only "why so much ritual gift-
giving involves the exchange of... goods or services rather than cash," 2
but also how frequently these gifts benefit the donee less than cash would.
Posner observes that "[j]okes about revolving fruitcakes and ugly ties
reflect our appreciation that much of gift-giving has nothing to do with
giving people something they need."83 If the donee would never buy the tie,
because it is ugly or extravagant or just not what he would spend his next
unit of discretionary income on, then value is destroyed. As Posner notes, if
79. Below I discuss other applications in order to illustrate certain criticisms of the signaling
model.
80. Supra text accompanying notes 22-24.
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altruism were the motive for a gift, one would usually give cash because it
is "almost always worth more to the donee than the goods it is used to
purchase." 84 But signaling explains well our felt compulsion "to give
[noncash] gifts even when we do not know what gifts will please the
recipient and fear offending him." 85 In particular, signaling explains the
survival of outdated gift-giving rituals, such as the Chinese custom of
giving away moon cakes, which apparently do get passed around as gifts
several times before the final donee consumes or discards them. 6 Of course
people sometimes use gifts to demonstrate that they know the tastes and
sensibilities of the donee. But this too is a signaling explanation-a good
gift shows that one has invested time and effort in learning those tastes and
sensibilities-rather than an altruistic explanation.87
Family law. One of the book's strengths is Posner's ability to state
concisely the central problem in an area of law. Regarding the law of
marriage and divorce, for example, Posner notes its sharp contrast from
contract law. Among other things, "contract law will enforce whatever
promises people happen to make, no matter how idiosyncratic, as long as
they are legal. Traditional marital law imposes on people a standard set of
obligations from which they may not deviate by agreement ... ." 88 Given
the prominence of contractual principles, the central puzzle is "why people
are not allowed to contract around the laws of marriage." 89
Posner admits that his answer is not "fully satisfying," but it at least
seems to point out an interesting direction.9" Posner begins by accepting the
description of marriage used by other economic theorists, in which a central
issue is how to control opportunism. Like other long-term contracts, the
marriage relationship permits the parties to achieve mutual gains, but the
realization of those gains is not guaranteed, because each party has an
incentive to shirk. That is, a spouse may selfishly refrain from behavior that
would be costly for him or her but create a net benefit for the marriage
(because the benefit for the other spouse exceeds the cost for the first).
Having a sexual affair is an obvious example, but less dramatic forms of
84. Id. at 52-53.
85. Id. at 52.
86. Id. at 169-71 (quoting Craig R. Smith, Moon Cakes: Gifts That Keep on Giving and
Giving and.... WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 1998, at Al). Once the gift becomes a signal of
cooperative intent (or ability), no individual benefits by deviating from the norm.
87. Although Posner claims that altruism does not explain many observed patterns of gift-
giving (such as the frequency of reciprocal exchange of noncash gifts), he does not entirely
discount altruism. POSNER, supra note 8, at 39. He does, however, reinterpret a different motive
for giving gifts-status-seeking-as simply a matter of signaling one's low discount rate. Id. at
56-58.
88. Id. at 69.
89. Id. at 79.
90. He actually suggests a number of explanations, but I want to discuss the one that most
clearly advances his broader themes.
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shirking include a spouse neglecting his or her marital duties-house or
yard work, rearing children, making money-in order to indulge in some
recreational activity such as golfing, playing cards, or drinking.
Posner then describes how various forms of nonlegal enforcement
(partly) deter opportunism, including community, norm-based enforcement
of marital bargains (in addition to nonlegal enforcement by husbands and
wives and their respective families). According to Posner, most Western
European cultures in most time periods before the twentieth century
engaged in a set of practices known as "charivari." 9 1 These practices,
"greatly simplified, consisted of gangs of local youths and young adults
who would harass people whose behavior violated local family norms,
including norms against marriages between people of different ages or
status, against wife-beating and husband-beating, and against adultery." 92
"Charivari" describes a particularly successful means of community
enforcement. Below, I express doubt about whether the signaling model
explains charivari. For now, the point is that communities are or at least
were substantial enforcers of marriage norms; a major reason parties
complied with marital obligations was the fear of community enforcement.
Given this assumption, Posner can explain the compelled simplicity of
the marriage contract as a means of facilitating community enforcement.
Under a regime of free contracting in marriages, individuals could, Posner
notes, marry multiple parties who also marry multiple parties, allow one
spouse to have a certain number of extramarital affairs in exchange for
undertaking additional childcare responsibilities, and do anything else.
"The problem is that the existence of multiple or idiosyncratic relationships
might be so confusing to the members of the community that community
enforcement becomes impossible. ... [C]ommunity members can deter
opportunism only if the actions that count as opportunistic are common to
all marriages.""9
This is a clever explanation. The insight also interestingly illustrates the
limits and potential of law, themes Posner explores throughout: First, it
reflects the old point that, for some subjects, law is not the only or even the
most important means of social control.9" Second, it shows that, even where
law does significantly influence behavior, it may do so mostly by aiding
nonlegal enforcers. Many legal scholars think of law as strengthening
norms by adding the threat of legal sanctions, but here the law works
instead by identifying what will count as contrary to the norm. Third, there
is a painful trade-off: Community enforcement may help to deter
opportunism, which on most normative accounts is good, but only by
91. POSNER, supra note 8, at 76.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 79-80.
94. See, e.g., ELLICKSON, supra note 6; sources cited supra note 1.
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denying to individuals their desire to fashion their own marital
arrangements, which on most normative accounts is bad. Posner
emphasizes another problem: Charivari was a blunt tool. The mob
sometimes punished individuals far more than was necessary to deter
opportunism and sometimes punished individuals for engaging in merely
idiosyncratic, not opportunistic, behavior.95
Conspicuous consumption. Thorstein Veblen coined the term
"conspicuous consumption" to refer to public and wasteful consumption
that advertises one's "pecuniary strength."96 Though some elements have
changed, Veblen's observations about the Gilded Age are generally true
today.97 Posner purports to explain conspicuous consumption via the
signaling model. A "tycoon," Posner states, "lives in an expensive house,
sends his children to expensive schools, wears expensive clothes, and takes
expensive vacations. These instances of conspicuous consumption cause
people to believe that the tycoon is indeed wealthy, and thus that he might
have the standard wealth-generating characteristics," including a low
discount rate.98 Elsewhere, he introduces a number of nuances to the
argument:
[B]ecause demonstrations of cultural competence can also serve as
signals, vulgar or inappropriate conspicuous consumption can
reveal that one belongs to the bad type. Indeed, because
consumption often reveals a high discount rate, exposing as it does
the consumer's inability to defer gratification, good types must
engage in conspicuous consumption, consumption that is stylized to
show that it is unlikely to satisfy intrinsic preferences. 99
In this case, the use of the signaling model seems forced. The obvious
economic prediction about two people with different discount rates is that
the one who values the future more will save more, which is why Posner
admits that "consumption often reveals a high discount rate."" 1 So here
95. POSNER, supra note 8, at 77. Posner further explores this theme in discussing criminal law
shame sanctions, which he criticizes because (among other reasons) the state is in no position to
predict how much punishment will occur as a result of its publicizing the offender's crime. Id. at
94-96.
96. THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS: AN ECONOMIC STUDY OF
INSTITUTIONS 68 (Random House 1934) (1899).
97. E.g., ROBERT H. FRANK, CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND: HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND THE
QUEST FOR STATUS (1985); ROBERT H. FRANK, LUXURY FEVER: WHY MONEY FAILS TO
SATISFY IN AN ERA OF EXCESS (1999).
98. POSNER, supra note 8, at 57.
99. Id. at21.
100. Id. Posner repeatedly notes that signals may be weakened by ambiguity, and one of his
examples is conspicuous consumption:
An instance of conspicuous consumption-the purchase of a yacht, for example-
might reflect the intrinsic tastes of one buyer, given his wealth, while it reflects the
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Posner is positing that an arbitrary signal arises that is the exact opposite of
the natural distinction that would exist between good and bad types: Good
types naturally save more but, somehow, they wind up distinguishing
themselves by spending more. This result is certainly possible; any costly
behavior can serve as a signal if the right expectations arise. But spending
can work as a signal only if the individual does not sufficiently enjoy the
resulting consumption; if he does, the spending is no longer costly. Yet
most conspicuous consumption produces some immediate pleasure beyond
what the cheaper alternatives provide. At best, therefore, consumption is an
extraordinarily "noisy" signal of discount rate. It is hard to tell whether the
person who owns a mint-condition antique car or a state-of-the-art laptop
computer gains no more utility from them than from the cheaper
alternatives, or, contrariwise, quite a lot of utility. The car owner may be
signaling a low discount rate, but the computer owner may have
just impulsively bought an object he has always coveted. It is therefore
difficult to see how a norm entrepreneur managed to make conspicuous
consumption a signal of low discount rates.
Savings, by contrast, would be a direct and powerful signal. Why is the
signal conspicuous consumption instead of conspicuous savings? Posner's
explanation is that only observable behavior can serve as a signal and that,
while much consumption is observable-including all that we call
"conspicuous consumption" -savings are not. But it is not a satisfying
explanation merely to observe that savings are, under current institutional
arrangements, a private matter. The question is, given the powerful
incentives to signal anything that shows a low discount rate, what force
keeps savings out of sight of the public?
Posner anticipates this point. He says:
Superficially direct forms of signaling-like displaying one's bank
statement or mutual fund shares-are, on reflection, quite
inadequate. Documents can be forged, and can be shown only to a
limited number of people. Financial resources can be shifted
around-for example, one can borrow lots of money, put it in a
bank account, obtain a statement, then repay the money a few
days later. So this behavior is really just cheap talk, like telling
people that you are rich, which people do anyway with less
effort of another buyer to signal his type. So signals can operate effectively only when
people have a rough idea of the tastes and endowments of each other. The fear that
others might misinterpret their actions causes people to send signals whose meaning
has become clear over time ....
Id. at 27.
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hassle. Credible signaling requires more complex behavior
and.. . complex institutions supplied by the market. °1
This argument is unconvincing. Posner identifies a consumer demand
for publicizing one's wealth and acknowledges that the most direct means
of meeting this demand would be to publicize savings. Yet Posner identifies
no structural failure to explain why the market would not supply an
institution to publicize savings instead of consumption, even though
economists generally assume the market will satisfy demand absent a well-
defined structural failure. It will not do to talk about forging documents and
moving money around. People can forge diplomas and evidence of
charitable contributions, but the problem is not severe enough, Posner
apparently believes, to prevent education or philanthropy from signaling
discount rates.102 More to the point, under his theory, not only should
people spend to advertise their savings, but others should incur costs to
acquire this highly revealing information. When market actors care about
ascertaining an individual's wealth correctly-as when the individual seeks
a mortgage or entry into a co-op-the market is quite good at countering
deception. Given the joint demand for publicizing savings, it is hard to see
why market actors are not sufficiently adaptive to provide a solution.' 3 In
sum, if Posner is right, the demand for an institution to publicize savings
should be extremely high, and its absence is extremely puzzling.
Posner's explanation also misses the personal and competitive nature of
conspicuous consumption. The signaling theory implies that people who
know each other particularly well would not bother to direct conspicuous
consumption "at" each other. ffA and B have known each other intimately
for years, they presumably have lots of information about each other's
discount rate and therefore no need to signal each other. But people often
seem to take particular delight in describing and displaying their most
wastefully expensive goods for people they know particularly well, without
regard to the need for forging a new cooperative venture. It is common to
observe competitive displays of consumption between long-time neighbors
or in-laws." Indeed, such displays can acrimoniously escalate with the
101. Id. at 226 n.6 (citation omitted).
102. Indeed, there are opportunities to fake most of the signals Posner discusses in the book,
but it is presumably the costliness of faking that preserves the signal.
103. Accountants could create standardized means of evaluating an individual's wealth
history, provide a difficult-to-forge certificate of their findings (or post them on the Internet), and
stake their reputation on their accuracy. Banks could offer to make public, at the customer's
election, records concerning savings in tax-deferred instruments like IRAs; penalties for
withdrawal before age fifty-five or sixty would prevent individuals from simply moving their
money around. Money managers could create "big savers clubs" (like charities' big donor clubs)
and spend the money necessary to publicize membership in them. All of this may seem overdone,
but it is the way the world should look if Posner is correct.
104. Alexander Pope captures the personal nature of such consumption:
Not for himself he sees, or hears, or eats;
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length of the relationship, undermining, rather than facilitating, additional
cooperation. In sum, the details of conspicuous consumption seem
inconsistent with the signaling model.'05
Race discrimination. Posner also claims that signaling explains race
discrimination. His account is simple. Like any costly behavior,
"discrimination against people with salient and immutable characteristics
that systematically differ from those of desired cooperative partners serves
as a signal to the latter that one has a low discount rate." 1o Posner then
describes various constraints on his theory. Discrimination works as a
signal only if the dominant group does not believe that its members
discriminate based on "idiosyncratic tastes" such as hatred or sadism, for
that would mean that the discriminator incurred a benefit rather than a cost,
robbing the behavior of any information about discount rate. 7 More
particularly, discrimination will work as a signal only if it is neither too
cheap-which occurs if the targets are "so few or poor or unskilled that
refusing to deal with them is not costly'l°"--or too expensive-if the
opposite is true.
Posner runs through a number of predictive strengths of the signaling
model of discrimination, particularly as it compares to Gary Becker's taste-
based explanation."° Having criticized the Becker model myself,"' I
certainly think that Posner's account of its weaknesses is compelling and
that signaling can explain a variety of patterns that the taste theory cannot
explain."' Whether or not that is true, I find Posner's account deficient in
two respects.
Artists must choose his pictures, music, meats:
He buys for Topham, drawings and designs;
For Pembroke statues, dirty gods, and coins;
Rare monkish manuscripts for Hearne alone,
And books for Mead, and butterflies for Sloane.
ALEXANDER POPE, Moral Essays, Epistle IV, Of the Use of Riches, in THE COMPLETE POETICAL
WORKS OF POPE 171 (Henry W. Boynton ed., Houghton Mifflin 1903).
105. For a more conventional account, see Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102
YALE L.J. 1, 38-44 (1992).
106. POSNER, supra note 8, at 133.
107. Id. at 135, 139.
108. Id. at 134.
109. Id. at 136-40; see GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 16-17 (2d
ed. 1971).
110. Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status
Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1003, 1036-43 (1995).
111. For example, Posner plausibly says that signaling predicts that discriminatory behavior
is distributed discontinuously among societies and within societies, that members of the in-group
shun and attack other members who refuse to discriminate, that discrimination rises in times of
tension, that "[d]iscrimination sometimes increases against groups whose skills and endowments
have increased," and that out-group members sometimes discriminate against members of their
own group. POSNER, supra note 8, at 136-40. In most cases, I believe my own "status
production" model can explain these patterns as well. See McAdams, supra note 110, at 1049-74.
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First, signaling seems unable to explain the pattern of who
discriminates the most. The signaling model says that those with low
discount rates will discriminate more. When using his model to explain
voting-another costly behavior that signals low discount rates-Posner
drew support from the fact that "voting increases with wealth and
education," which "supports the signaling theory but contradicts the taste
theory [of voting]." 12 The reason Posner gives for why the wealthy might
vote more in a signaling model is that it is more costly for the wealthy (they
have a higher opportunity cost for their time), so voting operates as a better
signal. But the available evidence shows a negative relationship between
these variables-wealth and education-and race discrimination.113 That is,
people with more education and wealth, who, on average, should have
lower discount rates and be willing to spend more to signal, spend less on
signaling via discrimination. How can the model explain this pattern?
Elsewhere Posner notes that "[d]iscrimination is always the poor man's
signal: [O]ne does not need any assets in order to issue this signal, unlike
the case of gift-giving or clothing fashion." 114 So Posner would presumably
reconcile the discrimination pattern by saying that the wealthy can afford
other signals, like conspicuous consumption, leaving the poor to signal via
discrimination. And, he might say that, among the poor, those with lower
discount rates discriminate more, a proposition for which there is, to my
knowledge, no disconfirming (or confirming) evidence. But note that voting
also does not require any assets, and should therefore be another poor
man's signal. No reason is given for the different predictions for voting and
discrimination. On the one hand, why do we not observe that the poor vote
more often and the wealthy use more asset-sensitive signals like
conspicuous consumption? On the other hand, if greater expense makes the
signal more attractive, why do we not observe that the wealthy commit
more time to discriminating than the poor? Although discrimination may
not require assets, time-intensive discrimination-in some manner a norm
entrepreneur might suggest-is a stronger signal for those who value their
time more.
112. POSNER, supra note 8, at 123.
113. E.g., Donald L. Noel & Alphonso Pinkney, Correlates of Prejudice: Some Racial
Differences and Similarities, 69 AM. J. SOC. 609, 610-12 (1964); Thomas J. Pavlak, Social Class,
Ethnicity, and Racial Prejudice, 37 PUB. OPINION Q. 225, 229-30 (1973); A. Wade Smith, Racial
Tolerance as a Function of Group Position, 46 AM. SOC. REV. 558, 563-68 (1981); see also
JUDITH CADITZ, WHITE LIBERALS IN TRANSITION: CURRENT DILEMMAS OF ETHNIC
INTEGRATION 91 (1976) ("Much social science literature supports the thesis that status-threatened
people will exhibit prejudicial attitudes toward minorities."); JOHN E. FARLEY, MAJORITY-
MINORITY RELATIONS 26 (2d ed. 1988) (" Persons in lower [socioeconomic status] groups tend to
report more negative views toward out-groups, to be more ethnocentric, and to express more
stereotyped thinking .... ").
114. POSNER, supra note 8, at 145.
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So the model could predict either that the poor or the rich discriminate
(and vote) the most. Indeed, one can manipulate the model further to make
it consistent with a third outcome. Suppose we found that middle-class
whites discriminate more than either wealthy or poor whites. We might
explain that result using signaling as follows. First, let us say we have three
instead of two types--"As," "Bs," and "Cs," with low, medium, and high
discount rates, respectively." 5 We could imagine that the As start
discriminating in order to signal their low discount rate. Eventually, the Bs
emulate the As and begin discriminating, but the Cs are not willing to bear
the costs to discriminate. Assume that the As are not worried about being
confused with Cs-there are lots of other signaling differences-but they
are worried about being confused with Bs. So the As find that they are
better off shifting their signaling resources into something that better
distinguishes them from the Bs. The Bs, however, cannot make this shift
(the As have found something too expensive for the Bsn 6), but they do not
stop discriminating for fear of being confused with Cs. If, as Posner
implies, those who value the future the most are, on average, able to
accumulate the most wealth, then we will find that the wealthy will be most
heavily represented by As, the middle class by Bs, and the poor by Cs. If
this effect dominated the others, then the middle class would be the most
discriminatory. This looks like an explanation, but it worries me that I can
so easily create wrinkles in the theory to explain any outcome.
Despite the model's flexibility, however, there are still some facts about
race discrimination that it seems incapable of explaining. The most
important is the nature of racist ideology, or at least, the particular United
States ideology rationalizing racism against African Americans. Recall that
a signal's costly nature must be apparent, and that ambiguity about cost
undermines the signal. A common cause of ambiguity is confusion over
whether the behavior satisfies the individual's intrinsic tastes; if so, it is not
a signal of his or her low discount rate. Posner says that ambiguity creates
the opportunity for norm entrepreneurs to clarify the signal or replace it
with a clear alternative.'17 He then explains racist ideology as arising to
clarify and preserve the discrimination signal. After explaining the potential
ambiguity-that a discriminator might be satisfying intrinsic preferences-
115. Posner says the two-type model is merely for convenience and that we could imagine
there are more types or that discount rates vary continuously. Id. at 19.
116. Assume the Bs cannot merely transfer their existing investment in discrimination to the
new signal the As are using. This will be true if one can only invest in the new behavior in discrete
amounts (rather than continuously) and the Bs are not willing to buy the minimum amount but the
As (with lower discount rates) are. An example might be country club membership; one is not
permitted to buy a "slice" of a membership.
117. POSNER, supra note 8, at 27 ("The fear that others might misinterpret their actions
causes people to send signals whose meaning has become clear over time."); id. at 31 (arguing
that the ambiguity of signals creates incentives to create new signals).
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he says that the Nazis invented a theory purporting to justify discrimination
against Jews based on the threat they posed "to the purity of Aryan blood, a
theory designed to show that discrimination against Jews is not the
satisfaction of a private taste." 118
Here is the problem. In the United States, the racist ideology purporting
to justify discrimination against African Americans does so by attributing to
them a host of strongly negative characteristics. In this ideology, blacks
are disparaged for being unintelligent, indolent, and untrustworthy." 9
Defenders of slavery and Jim Crow segregation justified these institutions
through claims that blacks were inferior to whites. Although there is
evidence that stereotypical thinking has declined in recent decades, the
stereotype persists that blacks are lazy, unintelligent, and impulsive.'
None of this is explained by signaling. To the contrary, the ideology
directly contradicts the signaling theory because it provides whites with a
selfish reason to avoid blacks. According to the ideology, discrimination is
not costly to the discriminator because blacks are poor cooperators; they
make bad employees, neighbors, and in-laws. Indeed, it is the supreme
contradiction of signaling theory that the racist ideology labeled blacks as
being short-sighted and impulsive' 1 -having a high discount rate-the
very fact Posner identifies as giving everyone a reason to avoid them. The
ideology not only makes discrimination seem too cheap to serve as a
signal-because the targets are "so ... unskilled" 2 2-but implies that
avoidance is actually beneficial. If shunning blacks is beneficial rather than
costly, the signaling theory would actually predict that whites would show a
118. Id. at 139. Posner continues the theme-that ideology avoids ambiguities in the signal-
with another example. He says that the ideology defining race clarifies the signal by turming the
inquiry of racial membership "from appearance to ancestry." Id. Posner further states:
Norm entrepreneurs exploit fears that discriminatory signals will lose their clarity,
and push for laws and practices that maintain or enhance the salience of characteristics
that provoke discrimination. Hence all the laws, from miscegenation laws in the South
to the identification requirements created by the Nazis, that are designed to make sure
that the signal remains clear.
Id. at 138-39.
119. E.g., STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 30-50, 70-72 (1981) (explaining
how science and religion were used to justify slavery on grounds of the inferiority of blacks);
GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 100 (1944) (" [Tihe Negro is believed to be stupid,
immoral, diseased, lazy, incompetent, and dangerous."). See generally MYRDAL, supra, at 83-
112, 582-85 (describing white stereotypes and ideology concerning blacks).
120. PAUL M. SNIDERMAN & EDWARD G. CARMINES, REACHING BEYOND RACE 62 (1997)
(reporting that in a 1991 survey of whites, 34% agreed that most blacks are "lazy"); Lawrence
Bobo, Group Conflict, Prejudice, and the Paradox of Contemporary Racial Attitudes, in
ELIMINATING RACISM 85, 88 (Phyllis A. Katz & Dalmas A. Taylor eds., 1988) ("In 1942,
approximately 60% of whites believed that blacks were less intelligent than whites. By 1964, that
figure had declined to less than 25%." (citations omitted)).
121. MYRDAL, supra note 119, at 107, 216, 655, 783, 959 (describing white beliefs that
blacks could not control their passions, lacked self-control, and did not save money).
122. POSNER, supra note 8, at 134.
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low discount rate by incurring the cost of cooperating with blacks. 123
Because the ideology is the opposite of what the signaling model implies, I
think the model is a poor explanation for discrimination against African
Americans. I am also skeptical as to how well it applies to other examples
of race discrimination, given how common it is for ideologies to disparage
the talents and motives of the discrimination targets.
Although I cannot be sure, Posner might respond by denying that
anyone actually believes the racist ideology. Throughout the book, Posner
points out situations in which people say things they do not believe and
then uses signaling to explain why.124 When discussing Nazi racist
ideology, Posner makes this move: "[T]he signaling theory explains why
people would publicly support ridiculous theories that they can easily see
through." 125 He contrasts the signaling theory with the preference theory of
discrimination, which "does not explain why norm entrepreneurs would
invent theories of racial supremacy and why these theories would receive
the public support of people who ought to know better." 126 Because Posner
does not explicitly discuss racist ideology about African Americans, I
cannot say for certain that he would make the same claim in this context,
but it appears so.
That people say things they do not mean is certainly an important truth.
Timur Kuran calls this phenomenon "preference falsification" and uses it
to explain sudden social change that occurs upon widespread discovery that
most individuals privately disagree with the publicly stated truths. 27 But it
is not plausible that preference falsification exists about all of racial
ideology. Among other reasons, it is hard to understand how children could
fail to embrace the racial ideology that pervades their society, unless
someone explicitly instructs them as to its falsity, but anyone who did so
123. To carry the analysis one step further: Even the most racist whites in the Jim Crow
South did engage in cooperative ventures with blacks. Whites routinely hired black women to
perform domestic work in their homes, which included rearing white children. E.g., PATRICIA
HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT 71 (1991); MYRDAL, supra note 119, at 652-53.
While the signaling model predicts that whites would discriminate where doing so was thought to
be costly-because blacks were desirable as partners-it conversely predicts that whites would
cooperate with blacks when doing so was thought to be costly-because blacks were undesirable
as partners. Yet again, the ideology suggested that blacks performed well at the tasks for which
whites hired them, which means the white behavior was not a good signal of discount rates. See
MYRDAL, supra, at 597, 1382 n. 14. Again, the ideology creates ambiguity rather than resolving it.
124. One example is propaganda, by which the state creates the opportunity for individuals to
signal loyalty to the state by "going along" with obviously false propositions. "The more baldly
untruthful the propaganda, the more clearly does a person signal his patriotism by declining to
disagree with it." POSNER, supra note 8, at 120. Later in the book, Posner explains the popular
discourse of incommensurable values-that one would never put a "price" on certain
relationships or values-as mere signaling rather than honest belief. Id. at 186-98.
125. Id. at 139.
126. Id.
127. KURAN, supra note 2, at 3-5, 247-88.
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would risk being labeled as a bad type for challenging the prevailing
ideology.128
In any event, it would not matter if Posner were correct in the
(apparent) claim that no one believes the racist ideology of their society.
Even if they do not, for the reasons stated above, the signaling theory still
does not explain the ideology that exists. The negative characterization of
African Americans does not serve any interest in the signaling game; to the
extent there is even a risk that anyone might believe it, it undermines the
clarity of the signal. In sum, a theory that fails to predict or explain the
content of racial ideology seems not to explain race discrimination very
well.
III. DOUBTS ABOUT SIGNALING: DISCOUNTING COMPLEXITIES,
QUESTIONABLE IMPLICATIONS, AND AN UNLIKELY GLOBAL EQUILIBRIUM
Stepping back from the analysis of specific norms, I now discuss
Posner's broader thesis. Law and Social Norms is audacious because it
offers to explain a great variety of social practices and norms through a
single, highly reductive, rational choice theory: Norms are merely the
equilibrium outcome of a signaling game. Posner does state at one point, "I
do not claim that rational choice theory can offer a complete explanation of
social norms or of cooperation." 129 At the same time, he offers to explain a
wide variety of specific norms-pertaining to manners, fashion, gift-giving,
conspicuous consumption, marriage and family, obedience to law, shaming
of criminals, voting, patriotic displays, and race discrimination-with
nothing but the signaling and commitment models. At no point does he
identify a particular norm or a type of norm behavior that his theories
cannot explain. Posner also makes clear in an early chapter on alternative
theories that he wants to push the explanation as far as it will go without
any help from other norms theories.13 At least for purposes of this book-
perhaps only as an exercise in model building-I think it fair to read Posner
as offering signaling (with commitment) as a general account of social
norms.
In the preceding Part, I criticized certain applications of the signaling
model-the norms related to conspicuous consumption and racist ideology.
128. Kuran uses this fact-that later generations believe the propositions earlier generations
merely said but did not believe-to explain the long-term effect of preference falsification. Id. at
184-89.
129. POSNER, supra note 8, at 46.
130. In chapter three, Posner considers and rejects a number of ways rational choice theorists
have attempted to complicate their model to explain norms-altruism, status and conformity,
emotions, and internalization. Id. at 39-40, 42-44. On the other hand, Posner expresses guarded
optimism about models of herd behavior and bounded rationality, which he occasionally employs
in the book. Id. at 41-42, 44-46.
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In this Part, I explore more general criticisms. Initially, I focus on the
foundations of the model: the notion of discount rates and their effect on
cooperation. In Section III.A, I point out some recent economic literature on
inconsistent (or hyperbolic) discount rates and explore its implications for
the model. I also demonstrate that one is not always better off attempting to
cooperate with someone with the lowest discount rate. Having examined
the signaling model up close, I draw back a bit. In Section LlI.B, I consider
some of its broad implications about individual behavior and the operation
of norms. In particular, I identify three implications of the model that are
contradicted by common observation: that norms will be weak in small,
stable, and integrated groups; that aged individuals will obey norms less
than others; and that individuals will never volunteer information that
reflects a high discount rate. In Section HI.C, I take a different approach. I
describe the kind of global equilibrium analysis that is necessary to
conclude that individuals would invest enough in signaling to produce the
set of social norms that Posner discusses. Although I do not provide a
formal account of the equilibrium, I argue that it is unlikely that people
would invest as heavily in signaling as Posner assumes because there are
more direct, less ambiguous ways to attract cooperative partners.
A. Two Signaling Problems: Inconsistent Discount Rates and
Concealed Cheating
In this Section, I call attention to two problems for the signaling model.
First, there is a controversy within economics about how people value the
future-more technically, about what sort of function best describes the way
individuals discount future costs and benefits. Some people may have
inconsistent discount rates: low when considering two future options, but
high when considering a present versus a future option. The resulting
complexity is not, by itself, a great challenge to the signaling model, but it
matters to other issues discussed later and is interesting in its own right. The
second issue is more serious: Where it is possible for individuals to invest
in concealing their defection, good types pose a greater risk than bad types.
Thus, individuals may not want to signal their low discount rate, at least not
below a certain level.
1. Inconsistent Time Preferences and Imperfect Self-Commitment
Posner presents a simple concept of an individual's discount rate.
Although he does not state the matter mathematically, implicit in his
analysis is that one values the future according to an exponential formula:
PV = FV / (1 + r)", where PV is the present value of a future benefit; FV is
the nominal future benefit, before discounting; r is the discount rate applied
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during each time period; and n is the number of periods in the future the
benefit will be incurred.' On this account, the only way people can differ
is by the simple discount rate-r. Good types have a low r value; bad types
have a high value.
But there are other ways that people might differ in how they value the
future. It is frequently said that people are impulsive in the sense that they
give in to temptation and then regret doing so. Many theorists have
observed that, like Ulysses facing the sirens, some people try to constrain
their future choices so that they cannot give in when temptation presents
itself.'32 If there is any truth to this, it cannot be explained by the simple
exponential discount function. With this function, I should not want to
constrain my choices and should not experience regret when I fail to
constrain them. I should always avoid regret because my preference
between two options should remain constant over time. To illustrate,
suppose I face a choice between benefit (cost) A, which accrues at time Ta,
and benefit (cost) B, which accrues at time T. Suppose that T will accrue
three units of time (hours, days, weeks, etc.) sooner than Tb (thus, T = T +
3). With exponential discounting, if I prefer B to A when T takes one value,
then I will prefer B to A for every value Ta may represent. A little more
concretely, say that option A is $10, option B is $12, and the units of time
are days, so that the constant is that I can have A three days sooner than I
can have B. If I prefer $12 in thirty-three days to $10 in thirty days, then I
will prefer $12 in ten days to $10 in seven days, and I will prefer $12 in
three days to $10 immediately (when T = 0).
An interesting array of empirical evidence falsifies this last
prediction.'33 When faced with the above sort of choice, there is evidence
that people (and pigeons! 134) sometimes prefer B to A when T is large, but
A to B when T is small or equal to zero. That is, when comparing two
options separated in time by a fixed amount, people sometimes prefer the
"later-large" option over the "sooner-small" option when both choices are
in the future, but the sooner-small option when it is available immediately
or almost immediately. This result is puzzling. If I know I am going to
131. Cf CHARLES J. GOETZ, LAW AND EcONOMIcS: CASES AND MATERIALS 159 (1984).
132. E.g., JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS 36-111 (rev. ed. 1984).
133. GEORGE AINSLIE, PICOECONOMICS (1992); RICHARD H. THALER, Some Empirical
Evidence on Dynamic Inconsistency, in QUASI RA'TONAL ECONOMICS 127 (1991); Richard H.
Thaler & George Loewenstein, Intertemporal Choice, in RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER'S
CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE 92 (1992); David Laibson, Golden
Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q.J. ECON. 443 (1997); George Loewenstein & Drazen
Prelec, Anomalies in Intertemporal Choice: Evidence and an Interpretation, 107 Q.J. ECON. 573
(1992).
134. G.W. Ainslie, Impulse Control in Pigeons, 21 J. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS BEHAV. 485
(1974); George Ainslie & R.J. Herrnstein, Preference Reversal and Delayed Reinforcement, 9
ANIMAL LEARNING & BEHAV. 476 (1981); cf. Frank A. Logan, Decision Making by Rats: Delay




prefer A to B when A is immediate and B is three days in the future, then I
should also select A when it is a week in the future and B is ten days in the
future. That way I will avoid regretting my decision when T = 0. Yet the
evidence shows that people choose inconsistently depending on the time at
which they are offered the choice.
Economists have used different terms to refer to this discounting
inconsistency; a useful one is "present-biased preferences." "When
considering trade-offs between two future moments, present-biased
preferences give stronger relative weight to the earlier moment as it gets
closer." ' This inconsistency captures common intuitions about
impulsiveness and regret. The bias also makes sense out of what are
otherwise baffling efforts of individuals to constrain their future choices. If
my present self would prefer that I wait a little longer for the $12, but I
suspect that my future self will at the last moment grab the $10, then I may
willingly enter a contract that forces me to wait the extra three days for the
larger sum. Translated into the context of dieting: If I now prefer that I not
eat dessert at tomorrow's dinner, but think I will then succumb if given the
choice, then I may rationally decide to act today to restrain my culinary
choices tomorrow.
This subject is complex, and economists and others have done much to
study it empirically and analytically. 136 I have sketched the concept only
enough to explain its relevance to Posner's signaling model. There are now
two ways that someone might be thought of as having a high discount rate.
As Posner discusses, an individual can have a consistently high discount
rate. In the above examples, these are the people who consistently choose
the early-small option over the late-large one. But a person might also have
a present-oriented bias, so that, despite having a low discount rate when
selecting between two future options, he or she has an inconsistently high
discount rate when choosing between one present and one future option.
These people are impulsive. If we think everyone has this tendency to some
degree, then we might call people impulsive when their present-bias is large
relative to others.
Whether time inconsistency affects Posner's signaling model depends
on what one thinks of the possibility of self-commitment--defined as any
action by which the present self constrains the choices of the future self.
Ulysses famously ordered his men to tie him to the mast and plug their ears
135. Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Doing It Now or Later, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 103,
103 (1999). Another term is "hyperbolic" discounting. See Laibson, supra note 133.
136. See, e.g., CHOICE OVER TIME (George Loewenstein & Jon Elster eds., 1992); George A.
Ackerlof, Procrastination and Obedience, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1991); Robert D. Cooter,
Lapses, Conflict, and Akrasia in Torts and Crimes: Towards an Economic Theory of the Will, 11
INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 149 (1991); Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Choice and
Procrastination, 116 Q.J. ECON. (forthcoming 2001); Thomas C. Schelling, Self-Command in
Practice, in Policy, and in a Theory of Rational Choice, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1984).
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so that they could jointly resist the sirens' song, while Ulysses could still
hear it. Self-commitment requires that people both foresee their future time
preference and have some means of constraining their future choices. If
there is no possibility of self-commitment, present-oriented bias operates
just like a high discount rate in the repeat-play prisoner's dilemma: Because
the rewards from defecting are immediate and the benefits of cooperation
are mostly deferred, the present-oriented bias favors defection. On the other
hand, if there is perfect foresight and perfect means for self-commitment,
then a person with a present-bias is just like someone with no bias. Thus, in
either extreme case, there is no need for the signaling model to consider the
possibility of time-inconsistency; the good type and bad type still capture
all the relevant distinctions.
But one should consider time inconsistency under the more realistic
assumption that self-commitment exists but is imperfect. Consider this
simple form of imperfection: People who foresee their impulsiveness can
self-commit in some contexts but not others. That is, the mechanisms for
self-commitment are sometimes available and sometimes not. If so, it will
become important to distinguish among good types: Some are "consistent"
in that they have a low discount rate and no present-bias, but others are
"inconsistent" because they have a low discount rate but a present-bias.'37
Among the inconsistent good types, some can foresee their present-oriented
bias and, when the necessary mechanisms are available, engage in self-
commitment. But others either do not foresee their impulsiveness or do not
know how to use any form of self-commitment to control it. Thus, there are
two new categories that I show are relevant to the analysis: (1) inconsistent
good types who can self-commit, and (2) inconsistent good types who
cannot self-commit. Imperfect self-control then complicates the signaling
story in two ways. First, it is possible that everyone will want to avoid all
inconsistent good types, but they will find it difficult to do so. Second, it is
possible that everyone will want to distinguish between inconsistent good
types depending on their ability to exercise self-control, but will find it
difficult to do so.
People will seek to avoid all inconsistent good types if, in the
cooperative ventures they seek, there is no available mechanism by which
their cooperative partner can self-commit against cheating. To use one of
Posner's examples, suppose an employer will incur the costs of training an
employee for six months, providing knowledge and skills the employee
could then take to another employer who would immediately pay a higher
wage. 3 Suppose a consistent good type, to gain cooperative returns over
137. Everyone wants to avoid bad types whether the bad types are consistent or not, so I will
not pursue a distinction between consistent and inconsistent bad types.
138. POSNER, supra note 8, at 11-13.
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the long run, would stay with the initial employer even after receiving the
training. A bad type, however, would immediately leave at the end of the
training. What would an inconsistent good type do? If we assume there is
no self-control mechanism-for example, no court or third party will
enforce an agreement requiring the employee to stay at the initial job-then
the inconsistent good type will give in to temptation at the last moment and
take the higher-paying job. The employer therefore wants to avoid any
inconsistent good type just as much as the employer wants to avoid bad
types.
A problem arises, however, because inconsistent good types will often
send signals just like consistent good types. In contexts where self-
commitment is possible, the inconsistent good types who can self-commit
will perfectly mimic consistent good types. Where self-commitment is
unobservable, the effect is to create noise: Some potential employees who
send signals of being a consistent good type can resist cheating only with
the help of a self-commitment device that is not available in the employer's
situation. For example, Posner says that charitable contributions are a signal
of the good type. But an individual with a low discount rate but a present-
oriented bias could commit to making charitable contributions in the
future-by pledge or contract or will. A pledge may not be legally binding,
but it raises the costs of not following through, so that someone who would
never just write a check to a charity would (1) make the pledge to write the
check in the future, and (2) write the check at the required time to avoid
sending a disastrous signal of backing out on a pledge.' But absent an
opportunity to pre-commit, this same individual would never make
charitable contributions and would cheat rather than cooperate in a repeated
prisoner's dilemma. Charitable contributions are then a noisy signal unless
the charity discloses which individuals gave without benefit of a self-
commitment device.
40
Imperfect self-control might complicate the story in a second way. Let
us replace the initial assumption stated above with the assumption that it is
possible to self-commit in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game. Now
individuals will want to interact with inconsistent good types if and only if
139. Another example is discrimination. Suppose that A owns a business and that
discrimination is legal. A can self-commit by announcing, and instructing his managers to
implement, a policy of discrimination. This decision incurs many of the benefits of the signal
before incurring any costs. The costs come later, when discrimination targets are less likely to
apply for jobs or when subordinates carry out the discriminatory policy without A's immediate
knowledge. The commitment strategy undermines the behavior's signaling function because later
observers see only the absence of any racial minorities but do not know how A brought this
about-with or without commitment.
140. If the self-commitment is observable, then self-commitment becomes a signal of an
inconsistent good type that people wish to avoid. A wants to avoid people who are overweight
(reflecting a high discount rate or a significant bias) or who are not overweight but seem to require
a strong commitment (for example, never go to restaurants, never keep any sweets in the house).
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they are capable of self-commitment. For example, suppose that A is
considering whether to marry B, and A knows that B will have opportunities
to cheat on their arrangement, either by having affairs or shirking at work or
with childcare. All of these behaviors are subject to some degree of self-
commitment. An individual seeking to be monogamous can self-commit,
for example, by avoiding being alone with others to whom he or she is
attracted. An individual who fears that he will ignore his children by
working on the computer may decide not to bring work home. In the
business context, a person might self-commit against cheating by agreeing
to a liquidated damages provision, or prevent shirking at the office by
leaving novels at home. In any of these cases, an inconsistent good type
with an ability to self-commit is just like (or nearly like) a consistent good
type.
Again, however, there is a difficulty. If there is imperfect information
about whether a situation included an opportunity for self-commitment,
then it will be difficult to determine whether inconsistent good types failed
to send a signal in that situation because they lacked the capacity or merely
the opportunity to self-commit. For example, assume that A observes that B
failed to make a charitable contribution or left a firm immediately after
receiving training. If A does not know whether there was an opportunity for
self-commitment in these contexts, then A cannot determine whether B is a
good bet for a cooperative venture.141 If B had an opportunity for self-
commitment but did not commit, then A wants to avoid B because she is
either a bad type or an inconsistent good type without the capacity to self-
commit. But if B lacked even the opportunity, then it remains possible that
she might have the ability to self-commit, and A may not want to rule out
the possibility of cooperation. Thus, the possibility of imperfect self-
commitment makes signals more noisy.
42
In sum, self-commitment can conceal important distinctions in type.
When self-commitment is not available in the prospective cooperative
venture, everyone wants to avoid inconsistent good types, but unobservable
self-commitment allows such individuals to mimic consistent good types.
When self-commitment is available in the prospective venture, everyone is
willing to interact with inconsistent good types who can self-commit, but
they will sometimes fail to demonstrate their ability to self-commit because
141. Of course, failing to send the signal immediately reveals that B is not a consistent good
type.
142. Where self-commitment is observable, it becomes an attracting signal, demonstrating
the ability to exploit available self-commitment mechanisms. This result is just the opposite of the
prior analysis where self-commitment, if visible, would repel others. Supra note 140. The point is
not that the prior analysis was wrong, but that the effect of a self-commitment signal depends on
whether self-commitment is possible in the prospective venture. Because both situations coexist-
sometimes self-commitment is possible in the prospective venture and sometimes not-it is
impossible to say in the abstract whether people will want to send the signal of self-commitment.
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they lacked the opportunity to do so in a given situation. When the
opportunity to self-commit is also not observable, it is impossible to
distinguish inconsistent good types who can self-commit from those who
cannot. Interpreting signals is more complicated and subject to even greater
ambiguity than Posner indicates.
2. Concealed Cheating: When Good Types Are Bad and
Bad Types Are Good
In the signaling model, the key inference is that a person with a low
discount rate will be more likely to cooperate. With minor modifications to
the model, however, this is not always the case. There are circumstances
where an individual choosing between two individuals should prefer to
interact with the one with a higher discount rate. This result is not possible
in Posner's stylized iterated prisoner's dilemma. There, defecting is
immediately detected and the party suffering from defection may retaliate
in the next round. Admittedly, Posner's results would still hold if we
introduced random "noise" into the model by imagining that one party
does not always interpret the other party's move correctly; that is,
cooperation is sometimes perceived as defection and defection is sometimes
perceived as cooperation. As long as mutual cooperation remains a possible
equilibrium (which requires some minimal level of correct perception of the
other side's move), those with lower discount rates are less likely to defect.
But suppose we modify the model to include nonrandom error. Suppose
that an individual can invest to increase the chance that his defection will be
perceived as cooperation. More precisely, assume there is some minimum
probability that cheating will remain undiscovered in the next time period
and, with effort, that an individual can increase this probability. Thus, he
can act to conceal his cheating. This is a highly realistic scenario. One
example is embezzlement. If an employee grabs the money in the cash
register at the end of the day, the owner will likely perceive the defection
and (at the least) fire the employee. But if the employee invests time and
other resources, he may discover a means of embezzling money so that the
owner does not notice. The owner will know he is making less money but
incorrectly attribute it to something other than the employee's cheating. A
second example is adultery. One spouse can decrease the likelihood that the
other spouse will discover his affair by investing time and effort into
concealing it. The aggrieved spouse experiences a loss of the other spouse's
time and attention but incorrectly attributes it to something other than
cheating.
Notice that in both cases, and as a general matter, the defector must
make some of the investment before he gains the benefits of cheating. The
employee must figure out how the security procedures work and how to
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defeat them before attempting embezzlement. The husband must arrange a
secluded place to meet his mistress and prepare a plausible explanation of
his whereabouts before he actually does meet her.
As a result, where concealment is possible, the good type may be a
greater threat than the bad type. Concealment reverses the order of the costs
and benefits that otherwise exist in Posner's model: First, the cheater incurs
the cost of planning and implementing the scheme; later, the cheater incurs
the benefits. Given this familiar structure, we can predict that people with
low discount rates will be more willing than people with high discount rates
to incur the immediate costs of concealment to acquire the deferred benefits
of cheating. As a result, good types will engage in more concealed cheating
than bad types.'43 A person with a high discount rate might grab the money
from his employer's cash register (and would probably get caught), but he
would not bother to invest months of time and energy to figure out an
embezzlement scheme. A husband with a high discount rate might commit
adultery impulsively (and would probably get caught), but he would not
invest days planning an elaborate scheme to meet his mistress secretly.1"
The people who are able to inflict losses on their cooperative partners for an
extended period of time (though they may eventually be caught) are the
good types.
Given the possibility of concealment, signaling now involves a
complicated trade-off. Bad types are not certain to defect; they are merely
more likely to defect. Compared to bad types, good types present less risk
of immediate defection, but now we see that they pose a greater risk of
concealed, long-term defection. In the real world, there will be some repeat
prisoner's dilemma situations for which the payoffs from cooperation
induce even bad types to cooperate. In those situations, good types will be
the only ones cheating, assuming they have discovered a means of
concealment. In these cases, one will wish to avoid good types.
To clarify the point, let us assume there are three types. 4 5 Between the
good and bad types is a "so-so" type with an intermediate discount rate.
Assume that bad types will probably defect immediately, but that, in many
cooperative ventures, both good and so-so types will probably cooperate.
Of course, good types are more likely to cooperate initially than are so-so
types (given lower discount rates), but this advantage is offset by the fact
143. This is a good point at which to restate that the terms "good type" and "bad type" refer
to nothing but an individual's low or high discount rate, respectively.
144. A third example, somewhat similar to embezzlement, is a complex swindle. I thank Hal
Krent for pointing out the relevance of the movie The Sting, in which the protagonists engage in
"the long con" -a con game that requires a considerable investment of time and money, and
presumably, therefore, criminals with a low discount rate. Bad types would settle for "the short
con." See THE STING (Universal Pictures 1973).
145. It is only a methodological convenience to assume there are exactly two types. Discount
rates are likely to be continuous. POSNER, supra note 8, at 19.
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that the good types are also more likely to invest in long-term cheating
strategies, and their concealment, than are the so-so types. Depending on
the exact trade-offs, an individual seeking cooperation might prefer so-so
types to good types; that is, she might prefer someone with a higher
discount rate (though one still lower than a bad type's). Thus, discount rates
are only contingently related to cooperation. If an individual structures his
business so that quick defections are immediately detected with high
probability, but worries that concealed defections might cost him a lot, then
he would prefer hiring individuals with a discount rate just low enough to
prevent their immediate defection, but high enough to prevent any
industrious form of embezzlement. Some individuals might prefer to take a
small risk that their spouses will cheat impulsively in order to avoid the risk
of marrying the type who can cheat for long periods of time without being
detected.
This point directly challenges the key inference of the signaling model.
The significance of the challenge depends on the relative threats of open
and concealed cheating: If concealed cheating were sufficiently likely, then
people would generally want to signal high rather than low discount rates.
But even if the potential for concealed cheating is limited, there will still be
a point where the signaling of low discount rates produces negative returns,
meaning that people will want to signal moderate rather than particularly
low discount rates. In either case, it is wrong to assume that people will
wish to signal a low discount rate "at every opportunity," 146 which makes it
unlikely that signaling explains all of the social norms Posner discusses.
B. Some Questionable Implications
Now let us consider the macro-implications of the discount-rate
signaling model of norms. Any theory of norm origin will likely make a
number of predictions about the general structure and operation of norms.
Throughout the book Posner does a good job of drawing out many
interesting and compelling implications of his model. But the signaling
model also implies, in my view, some rather improbable things. Here I
describe three such implications, each of which provides reason to question
the model as a general explanation for norms. I emphasize that these
implications are my own creations. Posner quite likely would deny that his
model produces these results. Let me also state that, in each case, one can
always think of some clever way to avoid the implication I am drawing, but
only by introducing complications of the sort that Posner generally rejects.
Posner offers signaling as a simple and parsimonious way of explaining
146. Id. at 21.
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norms, and I accept that methodological minimalism for purposes of
examining the model's implications.
1. Less Norm Compliance in Small, Stable, Integrated Groups?
In Posner's model, the returns from signaling should fall as existing
knowledge about a person rises. We expect that the signaling return from
providing the 900th piece of information about one's discount rate will be
less than the return from providing the ninth piece of information. I read
Posner to approve of this inference. He states at one point that the wealthy
feel less pressure to obey norms (that is, send signals) because people are
unlikely to forego cooperation with the rich.147 This observation makes
sense, however, only if people already know that an individual is rich. The
rich person will still need to signal as much as others until people discover
his wealth, but less afterward. Posner makes this point more generally when
he notes that new entrants are particularly likely to signal because they have
not had a chance to develop a reputation.'48 The converse is that old
entrants-those who have been in a market or community for an extended
time-need to signal less because more is known about them already.
Finally, the same point applies to those with a high discount rate. If a
person's alcohol addiction or gambling problem is well-known, for
example, he will signal even less than others with the same high discount
rate because he knows his signaling will fail to convince anyone that he has
a low discount rate. To generalize, other things being equal, the more that
people in A's community already know about A's discount rate, the less A
will signal. Signaling varies inversely with the amount of information
already known about the individual.
When applied to social norms, however, this generalization is almost
certainly false. The relationship implies that members of small, stable,
tightly integrated groups and communities will signal less than members of
large, transient, anonymous groups and communities. The former groups
and communities invariably have more information about their members
than the latter. Members of a more integrated group interact with each other
more frequently and along more dimensions, thus creating more
opportunities to infer someone's discount rate (or cooperativeness
generally). Members of a smaller group will find it easier to remember what
they have observed about each other. And in a more stable group-a group
with less turnover and thus populated by old entrants-there will be fewer
people at any given time who have no reputation. Thus, the smaller the
group, the more stable its membership, and the more frequently the
147. Id. at 28.
148. See id. at 20-21.
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members interact with one another, the more reputational information the
members will have about one another. In Posner's model, more information
means that these groups will signal less.
But recall that, in Posner's model, to signal less means to comply less
with social norms. Norms are nothing but the equilibrium outcome of a
signaling game. So the model implies that members of small, stable, tightly
integrated communities will comply with norms less than members of large,
transient, anonymous communities. Needless to say, this is the exact
opposite of what decades of social science has found. Life in small towns is
more regimented by social norms than is life in large, transient, anonymous
urban centers.149 The most powerful norms-causing people to bear the
greatest costs-are found in small, integrated groups. To take one example
of many, soldiers fight more aggressively in combat, at greater risk to their
lives, when fighting with a small, close-knit group of men they know
extremely well than when fighting with a group of relative strangers.
150
From Posner's model, one would predict the opposite: that strangers-all
new entrants vis-A-vis each other-would have a greater need to signal their
low discount rate to each other and would incur the greatest cost in doing
SO.
There is a possible response to this criticism. Small, stable, integrated
groups have not only a greater stock of reputational information, but also a
greater flow of such information. By contrast, the information flow in
anonymous cities may be so bad that perhaps signaling does not pay. If no
one will remember whether a particular individual sent the signal, then the
signal is not worth sending. Posner does not suggest this point anywhere
(and the point complicates some of his claims), but, in any event, it does not
really avoid the problem. It would explain why norm compliance does not
peak in urban centers. But it also implies a parabolic function: As we move
from the most anonymous settings toward smaller, more stable
communities, we will hit a point where people start to remember the signals
that were sent and suddenly see a upsurge in signaling. But as we move
further to even smaller, more stable and integrated communities, we should
eventually hit a point where reputational information is plentiful and
signaling declines. The closed community at the end of the spectrum should
in fact have little or no signaling-because everyone has known each other
since birth. So, at best, Posner's model implies (1) that at either end of the
spectrum there is very little signaling (in big groups because no one
remembers the signals, in small groups because everyone remembers other
149. E.g., JOHN DOLLARD, CASTE AND CLASS IN A SOUTHERN TOWN 15, 346, 354 (1937);
ELLICKSON, supra note 6, at 177-82; MYRDAL, supra note 119, at 126; ROBERT D. PUTNAM,
BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REvIvAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 119, 205-06, 463
n. 10 (2000).
150. See S.L.A. MARSHALL, MEN AGAINST FIRE 148-52 (1947).
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reputational information based on past interactions), but (2) that signaling
peaks somewhere in between. As far as I can see, the evidence contradicts
this prediction, because norm compliance and social regimentation continue
to grow as the group becomes smaller, more stable, and more integrated.
51
2. Less Norm Compliance Among the Aged?
Posner notes that in times of national tension, the stakes in cooperative
ventures are higher and therefore the signaling is higher. We can generalize
this point by saying that in his model, other things equal, the more A needs
cooperative relationships, the more A will signal. This generalization leads
to a "last period" or endgame prediction: that people will signal less as
they approach the end of their lives. As an individual approaches death, his
need for additional cooperative relations falls. Although Posner does not
explicitly say that the aged signal less, he seems to endorse the implication I
am drawing when he says: "People who have built up reputations over the
years frequently cash them in as old age overtakes them." 2 If the aged
signal less, in the model, that is the same as saying that such individuals
will comply less with social norms.
Casual observation contradicts this implication. The elderly do not
violate norms substantially more than others do. Indeed, the elderly often
lament the fact that new generations do not respect the norms that the
elderly grew up with, and the elderly sometimes find it impossible to stop
engaging in behavior that was once obligated by norms but is no longer
expected or appreciated. Of course, my casual observation may be wrong.
Finding reliable data on the subject is difficult, but the two cases in which I
know of data do not support the model. First, Posner says that voting is a
means of signaling low discount rates, but the elderly vote far more than do
other age groups, rather than far less. 153 Second, Posner describes race
discrimination as a signal of low discount rates, but the elderly endorse
racist attitudes more than do other age groups, rather than less.'54 The
model's "last period" implication is quite doubtful.
151. One might also respond that the difficulty of exiting close-knit groups raises the need to
cooperate with people inside the group, which might raise signaling. But that dependency just
means we should not observe much cheating. Because everyone knows who has the good
reputation for not cheating, there is no need for the arbitrary signals that Posner describes.
152. POSNER, supra note 8, at 50. He gives the example of an aging celebrity who sells his
reputation by making television commercials endorsing a product.
153. E.g., RAYMOND E. WOLFINGER & STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE, WHO VOTES? 47 (1980).
For more recent data, see U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, REPORTED VOTING AND REGISTRATION, BY SEX
AND SINGLE YEARS OF AGE: NOVEMBER 1998 (2000), available at http://www.census.gov/
population/socdemo/voting/cps1998/tabO1 .txt.
154. E.g., Glenn Firebaugh & Kenneth E. Davis, Trends in Antiblack Prejudice, 1972-1984:
Region and Cohort Effects, 94 AM. J. Soc. 251 (1988); Herbert H. Hyman & Paul B. Sheatsley,
Attitudes Toward Desegregation, 195 SCd. AM. 35 (1956); A. Wade Smith, Cohorts, Education,
and the Evolution of Tolerance, 14 SOC. SCI. RES. 205 (1985). Admittedly, these data do not
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Perhaps the prediction can be avoided.5 5 In discussing family norms,
Posner makes a point that might explain why, notwithstanding the general
implications of his model, the aged would still comply with norms:
The family name becomes a kind of trademark associated with
reliability. Parents might want to transfer this reputational
advantage to their children for several reasons .... Indeed, the
"family," like a corporation, might be thought of as an immortal
(or at least indefinitely long-lived) institution that solves the last
period problem by giving every member an incentive to maintain
the family reputation.
15 6
Posner uses this point to explain why parents might constrain the
marriage choices of their children. Because most parents expect to live for a
substantial time after their children marry, this control is not surprising. The
question is why parents would continue, after reaching an old age, to care
enough about the family name to bother complying with social norms. The
answer, presumably, is altruism. Just as many parents forego consumption
in life to leave their children an inheritance after death, parents comply with
norms to preserve the family name and leave their children a better
reputation after death.
I have no data on this subject, but I find this answer empirically
implausible and insufficient to avoid the endgame inference. Altruism does
not begin to address why childless individuals would obey social norms in
their advanced years. More generally, though family names counted for a
great deal in traditional societies, in modem societies, an individual's
reputation depends very little on his parents,'57 especially once the children
are middle-aged and when the parents and children live in different
communities (as is increasingly common). In the United States, business
partners and even some married couples know and care to know little about
each other's parents.'58 If A will not hold B's father's conduct against B,
suggest that white people become more discriminatory as they age, but that, at any time period,
the older cohorts consist of people who were more prejudiced throughout their lives. But whatever
forces caused prejudice to decline in general over the relevant time period, it is significant that
they had the least effect on people whose advanced age gave them a weaker reason to signal. The
signaling model would predict the opposite.
155. One might say that the elderly comply with norms because they gain utility during their
lives from believing that they will enjoy a good reputation after they die. But this is exactly the
kind of move that Posner's methodology-based on "stripped-down preferences" -rules out.
POSNER, supra note 8, at 41. To value posthumous reputation is to value it intrinsically (not as a
means of acquiring cooperative opportunities), which requires an actual preference for reputation.
156. Id. at 75 (citation omitted).
157. This is not to say that a parent's wealth or fame may not benefit his child in other ways.
It is simply to say that people are not likely to infer that the child must have a low discount rate, or
must be likely to cooperate, just because the parent has a good reputation.
158. One could imagine an elderly parent bringing disrepute to a middle-aged son or daughter
by committing a crime so heinous that others felt it necessary to shun the aged criminal's children.
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then there is no reason for the father to comply with social norms, even
though he altruistically cares for B. 59 All of which leaves us with the
unlikely conclusion that age is negatively correlated with social norm
compliance: that as people age, they feel increasingly free from the bonds
of social obligation.
3. No One Volunteers Information That Implies a High
Discount Rate?
Late in the book, Posner addresses why incommensurability claims are
common in popular discourse. These are claims in which people say that
they cannot compare different values-like money and personal
relationships-because they exist in different dimensions. For Posner, the
question is why people assert that they would never put a price on
friendship, and similar things, when people behave as if they do-they
"drop friends when the costs of maintaining the friendships become too
high" and "risk or violate family relationships by accepting attractive job
offers in distant locations." ,60 He explains such statements as signaling. His
argument for this is complex because speaking by itself is normally thought
to be cheap talk, not costly enough to serve as a signal. But Posner
concludes that "[p]eople are driven to extreme statements by their focal
nature and by the need to match the exaggerated claims of bad types." 161
Just as firms do not say their products are mostly high-quality, it does not
pay to state honestly that one cheats but only rarely, or to say that one
would cheat only under highly unlikely circumstances. Even if few people
believe one's absolutist claims, everyone is driven to make them.
1 62
Again, I wish to generalize from this example. The signaling model
implies something else about popular discourse: If people are constantly
concerned with signaling a low discount rate, they would never admit that
they are engaged in behaviors that signal a high discount kate. There is no
point in undertaking costs to signal one's low discount rate (and claiming to
hold incommensurable values) and then telling people that you have a high
discount rate or giving them information from which to infer that you have
a high discount rate. The model thus predicts that people will, where
possible, avoid revealing any behavior that signals a high discount rate.
But that would be highly aberrational. Much more likely, learning that B's sixty-five-year-old
father has not voted for years will have no effect on A's decision to cooperate with B. If Posner's
theory were true, A would presumably just recognize that B's father is in an endgame situation but
B is not.
159. To the contrary, if the father can somehow cash in on his past reputation, by cheating
people who expect him to cooperate, he may be able to leave B a larger inheritance.
160. POSNER, supra note 8, at 186.
161. Id. at 190.
162. Id. at 192-98.
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Indeed, if we were to apply Posner's incommensurability logic to this kind
of discourse, we might say that people would flatly deny that they
discounted the future at all. Such a statement would be obviously false, but
in Posner's view, so are common claims of incommensurability. If
competition with bad types compels good types to make absolutist claims
about loyalty and cooperativeness that are false and mostly disbelieved,
then why would the same forces not push them to claim a discount rate of
zero?
Obviously, this more extreme implication is false because people do not
claim to have a zero discount rate. But even the weaker implication-that
people would never volunteer information revealing a high discount rate-
is false. People frequently offer what should be damaging information
about their discount rates.163 In my experience, people admit to things like
waiting until the last minute to do their taxes, grade their exams, or finish
their Christmas shopping; being late to appointments; not "getting around
to" cleaning or performing routine maintenance; spending money
impulsively and regretting it later; and having difficulty paying off credit
card debt. Think how common it is for people to admit that they have
trouble maintaining a particular weight because they have a sweet tooth or
hate to exercise. All of these things are what I previously referred to as
natural signals of high discount rates. They all show that the person values
present costs much more than future costs or present benefits much more
than future benefits. If people care as much about their perceived discount
rate as Posner claims, then these behaviors are puzzling.
I can think of only two ways to try to resolve this puzzle in favor of the
signaling model. One is to say that people often admit to things that are
already generally known or will become known. If B is already going to
discover A's tardiness, then A has nothing to lose, and maybe something to
gain, by being the one to inform B of this fact. But often people admit to
things that others do not know and would not discover. When people say,
"I tell myself every year that I'm going to grade my exams (do my taxes,
start my Christmas shopping) early and get it out of the way, and then I wait
until the last minute," they are usually revealing information that the hearer
did not already know.1"
163. Russell Hardin makes a similar comment about Posner's recent article applying the
signaling model to explain tax compliance: that if tax cheating is a signal of high discount rates, it
is hard to explain why people ever volunteer (to others, not the government) their failure to
comply. See Russell Hardin, Law and Social Norms in the Large, 86 VA. L. REV. 1821, 1822-23
(2000) (commenting on Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86
VA. L. REv. 1781 (2000)).
164. Even an overweight person who says he has a sweet tooth is confirming what otherwise
might be uncertain: that he would not be overweight if he did not discount so significantly the
future benefit of being slim compared to the present benefit of eating something tasty.
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The other way to resolve the puzzle is to argue that, in cases where B
did not already know about A's high-discount-rate behavior, B is not likely
to believe what A says about it. Just as one would dismiss A's statements of
having a low discount rate or having engaged in the corresponding behavior
as meaningless cheap talk, one might dismiss A's statements of engaging in
behavior that reveals a high discount rate. But this answer would miss the
point of Posner's incommensurability discussion. Posner says that the
refusal to make such a claim is meaningful. To say "I will never cheat"
may not help much, but to say instead "I will not cheat unless the gains
exceed reputational losses" is self-destructive.1 65 In the same way, though
claiming to be debt-free is cheap talk, stating "I sometimes have trouble
paying off my credit card debt" should work against one's reputation.
That people nonetheless make this sort of statement undermines the
signaling theory. Posner's chapter on incommensurability discourse is
fascinating-treating what people say as important behavior and explaining
it within a rational choice framework-but he does not address what is, for
his theory, one of the more important aspects of what people say. When
they have the option of saying nothing, they sometimes volunteer things
that reveal a high discount rate, the last thing they should do if they are
focused on signaling a low discount rate.
C. Global Equilibrium: Would There Really Be This Much Signaling?
Consider now the sum of Posner's individual explanations of social
norms. He contends that signaling produces not merely norms of gift-
giving, or gift-giving and voting, but gift-giving and voting and table
manners and conspicuous consumption and race discrimination and
nationalism and a whole lot more. Realistically, the claim is that all of
social life is dominated by the signaling of discount rates, that people feel
the need, as Posner says at one point, to signal "at every opportunity." '66 If
this is true, then the demand for and productivity of signaling must be
extraordinarily high, so that over and over again the investment in (yet
another) costly signaling behavior is repaid with improved cooperative
opportunities. But there is another possibility. It is possible that the need to
signal runs out early on, before individuals get around to engaging in all of
these behaviors. If so, then signaling cannot explain all these social norms.
This is ultimately an equilibrium issue. Posner discusses signaling
equilibrium, but only for one signal at a time. For an individual, however,
there is also a general signaling equilibrium. One form of signaling is a
165. POSNER, supra note 8, at 190.
166. Id. at 21.
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substitute for another.'67 If a person adequately signals his discount rate by
gift-giving and voting, for example, he does not need to engage in
discrimination and patriotic displays. The individual reaches this point, not
when everyone believes that the individual is a good type, but when the
marginal costs of sending one more signal exceed the marginal benefits.
When all the individuals in society have reached their general signaling
equilibrium, there is a global equilibrium. At this point, no individual can
improve his position by shifting resources to or from signaling, or between
one form of signaling and another. The broad question I am raising is
whether we can say anything useful about when the system is likely to
reach global equilibrium. The precise issue is whether most individuals
satisfy their need for attracting cooperative opportunities without
complying with the social norms Posner wants to explain. If so, then
signaling does not explain why most people comply.
Posner does not address this issue. The omission is unfortunate,
because it is probably fair to ask him to persuade a reader, at least
provisionally, that global equilibrium would involve the very high level of
signaling investment his theory assumes. More importantly, there are
significant grounds for skepticism. In this Section, I explain the basis for
this skepticism and why I believe that the need to signal is not strong
enough to explain all the norms Posner discusses (even if the signaling
model is consistent with each norm). On the one hand, the signaling Posner
describes is very "noisy." On the other hand, there are less noisy
alternative methods of acquiring cooperative opportunities. Thus, I do not
try to ascertain how much signaling the global equilibrium would involve,
but I think these two points cast considerable doubt on whether it would
include so much signaling.
1. Noise: Ambiguities Decrease the Productive Efficiency of Signaling
The signaling model requires two inferences: first, that the behavior
that constitutes the signal demonstrates that the person has a low discount
rate; and second, that having a low discount rate makes a person a more
attractive cooperative partner. Neither of these inferences is true in every
case. Because a person's behavior is the outcome of a great many variables,
there is always considerable ambiguity in how to interpret that behavior.
And, as explained above, 161 sometimes one is better off cooperating with a
167. Posner makes this point when he says that whether one engages in the signaling of race
discrimination depends, in part, on whether there is "a superior form of signaling (like gift-giving,
patriotic displays, or religious discrimination) that produces the same results at less cost." Id. at
134.
168. Supra text accompanying notes 143-146.
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bad type. Together, these problems lower the return on signaling; that is,
they lower its productive efficiency in acquiring cooperative opportunities.
Differences in tastes. Posner repeatedly acknowledges the first
problem: that ambiguity undermines a signal. Most frequently discussed is
the ambiguity about whether an individual engages in a costly behavior to
signal a low discount rate or to satisfy an intrinsic preference. As a result,
Posner says, differences in tastes produce "noise" -a costly behavior may
reflect a bad type acting to satisfy a preference rather than a good type
signaling a low discount rate. Uncertainty over a person's tastes creates
uncertainty over his type, whatever his behavior. Posner refers to the
"crudeness of signals, the inevitability of error." 69
Robert Cooter has observed a particular kind of preference that
confounds interpretation of almost any signal: differences in risk
preferences. 7° Most of Posner's examples involve risk because there is
uncertainty about whether norm-violating behavior will be detected and
sanctioned. Consider the failure to vote, discriminate, or consume
conspicuously, or the failure to shun those who violate a social norm. Now
imagine two people, A and B, with identical discount rates, but with
different preferences regarding risk: A is risk averse and B is risk preferring.
Because of the uncertainty about whether their norm violation will be
sanctioned, A values the cost of the possible sanction at more than the
expected sanction (which is the probability of detection multiplied by the
cost of the sanction), while risk-loving B values it at less than the expected
sanction. As a result, A is more likely to conform to the norm than B, even
though they have the same discount rate. In some cases this noise will be
particularly disruptive of the signaling scheme, because an individual who
seeks to avoid bad types might actually prefer to cooperate with risk-loving
good types, so the same norm-violating behavior may both repel and attract
cooperative partners.
Differences in wealth. Differences in wealth provide another source of
noise. There being no reason to think signaling is an inferior good, the
amount a bad type spends on signaling will rise with his wealth, so the
wealthy bad type may outsignal a poorer good type. Posner observes that
wealth differences may result from differences in discount rates-those
who take the long view are better able to accumulate wealth.'7
1 The extent
of this correlation is unknown, but, on any account, is less than one-to-one.
So there will be many rich bad types and poor good types. Uncertainty
169. POSNER, supra note 8, at 38.
170. Robert Cooter, Statement at the University of Virginia School of Law Olin Conference
on Legal Construction of Norms (Feb. 25, 2000).
171. See POSNER, supra note 8, at 180-81.
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about another's wealth will create uncertainty over his type, whatever his
behavior. Perhaps not voting shows that A has a high discount rate, or
perhaps it shows that A cannot afford a car or the time it takes to use public
transportation to get to the voting area.
Present-biased time preferences and differences in self-commitment.
The next source of noise is the inconsistent time preferences discussed
above.172 In addition to a low discount rate, one sometimes prefers to
interact with someone with no present-bias, a consistent good type who has
no impulsive inclinations he needs to restrain. But where self-commitment
is not observable, it will be difficult to distinguish between consistent and
inconsistent good types. Conversely, sometimes one is willing to interact
with inconsistent good types as long as they have the ability to self-commit.
But, again, if the opportunities for self-commitment are not always present
and are not always observable, then one cannot easily determine whether
the person who failed to send the requisite signal lacks the capacity or
merely the opportunity for self-control. The result is more noise.
The threat of concealed cheating from good types. The prior sources of
noise concern the difficulty of determining another's discount rate. The
final problem is that the optimal discount rate for a cooperative partner may
be something other than the minimal rate. As discussed above, the reason is
the threat of concealed cheating. Even if A believes that B has a lower
discount rate than C, A may believe that C has a sufficiently low discount
rate to resist the option of immediate defection in each period, but a high
enough discount rate not to be tempted by long-term cheating strategies that
require planning and investment. On the other hand, A may fear that B's
discount rate is so low that the dangers of concealed cheating outweigh the
incremental gain from B being less likely than C to defect immediately. The
concealment threat could be sufficiently powerful, relative to the immediate
defection threat, to eliminate completely the motive to signal low discount
rates. But even if some signaling still pays, people will want to signal a
discount rate above the minimum. Signaling an intermediate rate is an
extremely delicate task. It means that there is a danger of being
misinterpreted at both ends, having too high or too low a discount rate.
There is now a danger that what is optimal for one person (who mostly
fears immediate defection) is not optimal for another (who mostly fears
concealed and prolonged defection). Consequently, one may wonder if the
game is worth the candle. More generally, all four sources of noise lower
the productivity of signaling, to the point where the costs might exceed the
returns.
172. Supra text accompanying notes 132-142.
2001]
The Yale Law Journal
2. ReputationalAlternatives to Signaling
Another reason to be skeptical that people would invest so much into
signaling their discount rates is that they have other means of securing
cooperative opportunities. Primarily, they can establish a reputation for
cooperation. It is useful to think of the discount-rate signaling model as an
extension of a broader theory of reputation. Quite a bit has been written
about reputation; 173 we should begin by distinguishing what has been said
from what Posner's book adds. The conventional view is that one develops
a reputation for reliably doing X by always (or almost always) doing X.
174
One gains a reputation for honesty, for example, by always telling the truth,
or at least telling the truth more than others. One gains a reputation for
delivering goods on time by delivering goods on time and, more generally,
for cooperating rather than defecting by cooperating (at least absent a prior
defection). Reputation works this way because, by observing an individual
cooperate in a variety of settings, we conclude that his situation is one in
which the benefits of cooperating generally exceed the costs. Maybe the
individual has internalized an obligation to cooperate; maybe he values the
esteem that he earns and the disapproval he avoids by cooperating; maybe
he has a low discount rate and has decided that cooperating serves his long-
run interest. Whatever the reason, we come to believe we can rely on this
person to cooperate, at least more than others, because we have some
evidence that it is in his interest to do so.
Signaling supplements the reputational model in the following way:
One develops a reputation for reliably doing X by doing Y. While the
connection between doing X in the past and doing X in the future is
straightforward, the signaling theory less obviously connects behaviors
other than X to one's reliability at doing X. In Posner's theory, X is one's
willingness to cooperate in an iterated prisoner's dilemma, and Y is a signal
of a low discount rate. If we observed the individual cooperate on many
occasions in iterated prisoner's dilemma situations, we might conclude that
he was a reliable cooperator because he had a low discount rate. But Posner
disaggregates the inference about discount rates from the observation about
cooperation. One of the book's fundamental contributions is to push the
173. The game theory literature on reputation begins with David M. Kreps & Robert Wilson,
Reputation and Imperfect Information, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 253 (1982); and Paul Milgrom &
John Roberts, Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 280 (1982). For
influential discussions in the legal literature, see David Chamy, Nonlegal Sanctions in
Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REv. 375 (1990); and Robert E. Scott, A Relational
Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 597 (1990).
174. E.g., Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, Maintaining a Reputation When Strategies
Are Imperfectly Observed, 59 REv. ECON. STUD. 561, 561 (1992) ("IT]he idea is that if a player




economic understanding of reputation beyond the 'simple model to this
more complex one.
But it is easier to show that signaling discount rates can attract
cooperative opportunities than it is to prove that, in global equilibrium,
most people would signal by complying with all the norms Posner
discusses. In seeking cooperative opportunities, an individual will want to
invest first in the behavior that generates the most returns. It should be
fairly obvious that the best way to start is by investing in the conventional
means of acquiring reputation. The basic reputational model exploits
simplicity: The connection between doing X in the past and doing X in the
future is easy to recognize. By contrast, the signaling model is noisy
because it depends on a more complex inference between doing Y in the
past and doing X in the future. Thus, if a person seeks to convince others
that he will keep his promises, it would be odd to invest in signaling a low
discount rate (by, say, conspicuous consumption) before he invested
significantly in keeping his promises. Equally implausible would be a
manufacturing company signaling its interest in the long view by spending
lots of money on ornate office architecture but at the same time defaulting
in various contractual relationships. One expects that the direct means of
producing a reputation-by acting accordingly-is the most efficient
means, and that an individual will invest in that means before using an
indirect means of signaling.
In his discussion of the reputational alternative to signaling, Posner
acknowledges that a merchant can "develop a reputation as a person who
rarely or never cheats ... by not cheating in previous games." 175 He then
adds: "But this strategy succeeds only to the extent that information flows
sufficiently freely and memories are good; and also the strategy obviously
cannot be used by a new entrant to the market." 176 These two points are
sufficient to show that there is some room left for signaling; there are some
situations where signaling will work for the individual better than
conventional reputational investments.
But the question is whether these two points are sufficient to explain all
the signaling Posner describes elsewhere in the book. It is true that new
entrants will not yet have had the opportunity to engage in the behavior-
cooperating-for which they seek to build a reputation. But this cannot
justify the ubiquity of signaling in Posner's model because most market
players are not new entrants. One might imagine that new entrants signal
their low discount rate for a while and then, after cooperating a few times,
begin to rely increasingly on their reputation. But that would produce very
175. POSNER, supra note 8, at 20.
176. Id.; see also id. at 21 ("One wants a general reputation as a 'cooperator,' a person with a
low discount rate, and one establishes that reputation both by declining to cheat in repeated games
and by sending signals at every opportunity.").
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different results from the behaviors Posner seeks to explain. Discount-rate
signaling should then be dominated by new entrants, as newcomers in a
community who feel the need to adopt an exaggerated sense of identity with
and loyalty to the place in order to be accepted. In the norms Posner
describes, however, not only do old entrants conform, but new entrants do
not even seem to conform more than others.
177
As to the second point, it is true that the value of investing in reputation
depends on the quality of information flows and memory. But signaling
also depends on memory and information flows. Many of Posner's
signals-for example, voting, discrimination, and patriotic displays-will
be observed only by a limited number of people, who may also forget or
fail to communicate their information. An employee is surely better off
spending extra time at work impressing his current employer for the
purpose of getting a favorable job reference for future employers, than
spending that same time signaling a low discount rate by participating in
patriotic rallies. Moreover, one can invest to raise the level of information
flows about one's reputation, and thereby make up for faulty memories.
Advertising the high rating one's product received in Consumer Reports is
likely to be more productive than spending the same money on the signal of
conspicuous consumption. Posner does not explain how there could be a
market in which there was better flow of information about signaling than
about conventional reputation, nor does he limit his norms analysis to such
settings.
So it appears that the reputation strategy will almost always trump the
signaling strategy. There is a further problem. Even when an individual
decides to signal, it is doubtful that anyone would begin with the behaviors
Posner finds most interesting. Recall my distinction between natural and
arbitrary behaviors.178 Natural behavioral differences will arise between
good and bad types before anyone recognizes the behaviors as signals.
Valuing the future more, good types are more likely to save for retirement,
invest in education, have friends, exercise, and have regular dental check-
ups. Valuing the future less, bad types are more likely to miss
appointments, procrastinate, overeat, develop addictions, and borrow
money. If people need to signal, they will surely begin with these stable and
intuitive distinctions. With natural distinctions, there is no coordination
game to be solved by a norm entreprenour. But Posner is not interested in
177. For example, it does not appear that new entrants to a community took the lead in
charivari, see supra text accompanying notes 91-92, though Posner uses signaling to explain it.
Nor does Posner suggest that new entrants comply more strongly than old entrants with the norms
compelling individuals to give engagement rings or sanction criminals. See POSNER, supra note 8,
at 71, 89-90. That established community members seem to comply as much as new entrants
makes it unlikely that signaling is the explanation for the norm.
178. Supra text accompanying notes 38-48.
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this form of signaling; it is only by extending the model to arbitrary signals
that he can explain social norms.
Let me then summarize the problem. Individuals need to attract
cooperative partners. They can choose between three strategies: investing in
(1) establishing a reputation for cooperation (or more specific behaviors
others find desirable) by engaging in that behavior, (2) signaling by
exaggerating the natural distinctions that arise between good and bad types,
or (3) signaling by engaging in an arbitrary costly behavior that a norm
entrepreneur has established as the means of signaling one's type. People
are likely to invest in the most productive means first. Reputation-building
is more productive than signaling because, being simple and direct, there is
less difficulty making the necessary inferences from the behavior. Natural
signaling is more productive than arbitrary signaling because it is more
stable and intuitive, and in any event, is more likely to arise first because it
requires no norm entrepreneur. All of which leads back to the question: In a
global equilibrium, would people even require arbitrary signals? Even if
they would, it seems unlikely that they would want to invest as much in
such signaling as would cause them to comply with all the norms Posner
addresses.
This is not to deny that signaling may be the best explanation of certain
behavior. I said previously that Posner's analysis of gift-giving is
powerful.'79 Let me now explain why. First, as Posner explains it, gift-
giving is a behavior narrowly aimed at the particular person whom the
signaler wants to convince of his low discount rate. By contrast, most of
Posner's other examples involve behaviors that are broadcast to the whole
world with the hopes of reaching someone whose opinion actually matters
to the signaler. In addition, gift-giving signals more than just a low discount
rate; it signals all the factors that make one individual willing to cooperate
with another. 18 A might find lots of good types with the same low discount
rate, but perceive that the payoffs from some ventures will be better than
others. These perceptions are based in part on his private information about
his needs and capabilities. Thus, when A gives the gift to B and not to C, he
signals to B not only a low discount rate, but other factors that make him
believe the mutual benefits from an A-B venture are high. Because there is
other information being signaled, the gift-giving analysis is largely immune
to the above criticisms of discount-rate signaling.
But the other signals Posner discusses broadcast one's discount rate, not
individualized suitability for cooperation. I find it hard to believe that, in
global equilibrium, the investment in these noisy strategies would be very
179. Supra text accompanying note 80.
180. Posner makes this point when he says that parties in an ongoing cooperative venture
give gifts to signal that none of the important underlying factors, discount rate included, have
changed. POSNER, supra note 8, at 21.
2001]
The Yale Law Journal
high. There is nothing to say that decisively resolves the matter, but one
way to think about the issue is to assume we are in global equilibrium and
ask whether people have exhausted the reputational and natural signaling
strategies. If, in equilibrium, they have not exhausted strategies (1) and (2),
it seems unlikely they would invest much in strategy (3). But people have
not exhausted strategy (2): As I stated above, people admit to short-sighted
behaviors that naturally identify them as a bad type-being late for
meetings, procrastinating, spending impulsively, avoiding the dentist." If,
at the margin, one can create the same cooperative opportunities either by
keeping quiet about one's own impulsiveness and procrastination or by
spending time or money signaling, then one should obviously pick the
former option every time. That we sometimes see people foregoing that
option suggests that they exhaust their need for reputation without using the
arbitrary signaling behaviors that Posner addresses. The common admission
of short-sightedness suggests that what others believe of our discount rate is
fairly insensitive to small bits of information, even among people who do
not know us well. Or maybe our discount rate is, in practice, such a small
part of how good we are in cooperative relationships, that what others
believe about our cooperativeness is fairly insensitive to small bits of
information about our discount rate. In either event, it would be a mistake
to view discount-rate signaling as the great engine of social life.
IV. NORMS AND ECONOMIC METHODOLOGY:
WHAT IS THE OPTIMAL LEVEL OF REDUCTIONISM?
I have not yet discussed perhaps the most striking aspect of Law and
Social Norms: its reductionism. Seeking to provide a parsimonious account
of norms, Posner's theory "relentlessly ignore[s]" what he calls the
"interior life" 182 of human beings. At a time when other theorists are
working to complicate the rational choice paradigm's understanding of
human motivation, 83 Posner, in his theory regarding discount-rate
signaling, avoids or aspires to avoid anything that might qualify as a
normative motivation. One might divide such motives into three categories:
internalized values, moralistic emotions, and the desire for external
approval. The signaling and commitment models clearly have no need for
the first: internalized values. Posner purports to explain norms without
relying on any preferences for specific norm obligations or more general
181. See supra Subsection III.B.3.
182. POSNER, supra note 8, at 43.
183. E.g., SKYRMS, supra note 3; Brennan & Pettit, supra note 3; Korobkin & Ulen, supra
note 5; Elinor Ostrom, A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective
Action, Presidential Address Before the American Political Science Association (1997), in 92 AM.
POL. Sci. REV. 1 (1998).
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tastes for altruism, reciprocity, or status. Second, Posner's models give no
role to moralistic emotions (or any emotions). Anger and love, for example,
do not influence norm creation or enforcement. Third, the theory avoids
relying on a desire for the approval of others. In the signaling and
commitment models, individuals place no intrinsic value on what others
think of them. A does not gain utility directly from B's moral approval of,
positive attitude toward, or warm feeling for A. Thus, in Posner's models,
none of these potential normative motivations-values, emotions, or
approval-is necessary to explain why individuals obey norms or why
norm entrepreneurs try to create them. The humans are thus "stripped
down" to simple, mostly selfish and rational individuals who pursue
material, not normative, ends.1 4
Omitting values and beliefs about what people ought to do, the model
of discount-rate signaling seeks to explain norms without referring to
anything normative. The spareness of the model is so profound that it raises
the terminological question of whether the behavioral regularities that
Posner addresses are even norms. The term "norm" is usually used to refer
to a behavioral regularity accompanied by some kind of normative
motivation, the least of which are approval (moral or otherwise) of
conformity to the regularity and disapproval of nonconformity.'85 The
behavioral regularities that Posner describes, which arise from "partial
information-either about the value of some activity or about the character
of people who engage in it" '86-might be considered a custom or
convention or something else, but "norm" seems an odd term if the
inhabitants of the theory have no normative commitments or beliefs that
contribute to the regularity.
But this is only a semantic point. Posner would simply say that,
whatever term is used, he wants to explain the regularities of behavior
others have explained through normative motivations. On the substantive
issue-why omit normative motivations?-Posner uses the difficulty of
explaining these interior features of human life (except by tautology) to
justify employing Occam's razor to cut them out of the theory. Early in the
book, he states:
Readers will object that .... [t]hese behaviors bubble forth from a
cauldron of instincts, passions, and deeply ingrained cultural
attitudes.
My response is that this book reflects a methodological
commitment. My claim is that rational choice theory can shed light
184. Posner's term is "stripped down preferences." POSNER, supra note 8, at 41.
185. See Richard H. McAdams, Conventions and Norms (Philosophical Aspects), in
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES (Neil J. Smelser &
Paul B. Baltes eds., forthcoming 2001); Pettit, supra note 3, at 728.
186. POSNER, supra note 8, at 41.
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on social norms by focusing on the reputational source of
behavioral regularities to the exclusion of their cognitive and
emotional sources. I do not claim that rational choice theory can
offer a complete explanation of social norms or of cooperation.
Cognition and emotion are not irrelevant. They are just not well
enough understood by psychologists to support a theory of social
norms, and repeated but puzzled acknowledgments of their
importance would muddy the exposition of the argument without
providing any offsetting benefits.187
In this passage, Posner does not explicitly address all the possible elements
of normative motivation, but elsewhere he criticizes norms theories that
make "strong assumptions about people's utility functions." 188 In sum, his
omissions are deliberate, based on a methodological commitment to
eliminate that part of the whole that he finds not suitably explained or
explainable.
Rendering the interior life causally unimportant presents the most
provocative aspect of the book-that we can understand and explain norms
without using any sort of normative motivation. Ultimately, one cannot
come to grips with Law and Social Norms without deciding whether this
simplifying move reflects sound principles of causal explanation or
excessive reductionist zeal. It is far too easy to make the latter charge,
especially for those who find any reductionism to be too much. I agree with
Posner that all explanations omit; to move beyond description, explanation
requires identifying some part that is a key insight to the whole, more
important for understanding than what is omitted. I also join Posner in
thinking that the most important element to understanding social
phenomena is the individual motivations and strategies that give rise to
them. We may miss something important in trying to explain social forces
by aggregating individual action, but the apparent alternative-to
give "social forces" some collective, anthropomorphized power over
individuals-is worse. Some who agree with these statements still reject
rational choice explanations as implausible. But again, I agree with Posner
that focusing on individual interests (though I conceive of those interests to
include normative commitments in ways I explain below) captures an
enormous amount. The collection of theories represented by "rational
choice" has made substantial progress by relentlessly searching for the
individual interests at play.189 Sharing all of these basics with Posner, I do
187. Id. at 46.
188. Id. at 40.
189. One type of progress, which some invariably see as a defeat for rational choice, see, e.g.,
GREEN & SHAPIRO, supra note 11, at 72-97, rather than its accomplishment, is the precise
identification of behaviors and motivations that are neither rational nor self-interested, see, e.g.,
Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 5 (calling for modifications of the rationality assumption); Ostrom,
[Vol. 110: 625
Signaling Discount Rates
not wish to dismiss casually the signaling theory because it avoids any
discussion of the interior life.
Nonetheless, this is where I get off the reductionism train. Even if
Posner were right in thinking that there is no adequate rational choice
explanation for norms that incorporates normative motivations, I cannot
agree that we should stop looking for one. Or, in a way I hope to make
clear, his theory is not sufficiently predictive to make the case for ignoring
the common intuition that normative motivations matter. Absent a highly
predictive alternative theory, I think one can justify cutting normative
motivations out of the explanation only if one of the following is true: (1)
normative motivations do not actually exist, or (2) normative motivations,
while they exist, are unrelated to the behavior we call norms. Posner
explicitly rejects the first proposition, and the second is simply not tenable.
A. The Troubled Existence of Normative Motivations in
Law and Social Norms
Taking the first point, I understand how someone could dispute which
one of the normative motivations I mentioned is the most important (as well
as contest my categorization). Perhaps Robert Cooter is right to emphasize,
along with sociologists, the importance of norm internalization, what I have
called values.19 ° Or perhaps Peter Huang and others are right to emphasize
emotions, particularly the moralistic variety. 91 Perhaps Philip Pettit and I
are right to emphasize the motivating power of a desire for esteem, that
individuals often intrinsically care whether others approve or disapprove of
them. 92 In many cases, taking one of these as a starting point allows a
theorist to minimize the importance of the other two. But I find it hard to
understand how one can blot out all three at once.
In any event, Posner does not actually deny the factual importance of
normative motivations. Although these motivations have no formal role in
supra note 183 (calling for "second-generation" rational choice models based on the results of
research testing the simpler models).
190. E.g., Robert Cooter, Law and Unified Social Theory, 22 J.L. & Soc'Y 50 (1995);
Cooter, supra note 12; Robert Cooter, Normative Failure Theory of Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV.
947 (1997).
191. E.g., Peter H. Huang, Reasons Within Passions: Affects and Attributions in Property
Rights Bargaining, 79 OR. L. REV. (forthcoming Summer 2000); Huang & Wu, supra note 12;
see also ERNST FEHR & SIMON GACHTER, COOPERATION AND PUNISHMENTS IN PUBLIC GOODS
EXPERIMENTS (Inst. for Empirical Research in Econ., Univ. of Zurich, Working Paper No. 10,
1999) (finding cooperation in the provision of public goods sustained by negative emotions
directed at free-riders).
192. Brennan & Pettit, supra note 3; McAdams, supra note 10, at 355-57; Pettit, supra note
3; see also Robert Sugden, Normative Expectations: The Simultaneous Evolution of Institutions
and Norms, in ECONOMICS, VALUES, AND ORGANIZATION 73 (Avner Ben-Ner & Louis
Putterman eds., 1998) (explaining norms as arising from the effort to avoid resentment created by
frustrating others' normative expectations).
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the signaling or commitment models, they find their way repeatedly into the
application chapters of Law and Social Norms. Posner acknowledges that
some people "care deeply" about their religious beliefs and "theological
commitments," '193 that others "care[] deeply about the good of the
country," 194 and that a community may "deeply disapprove[]" of certain
criminal behavior. 95 He mentions that some people feel contempt for
members of other groups,"' some "feel an obligation" to criticize the
government, 97 others "are often offended" by pornography and certain
unpopular beliefs,98 and some may regard littering as "bad behavior." " In
each case, Posner not only notes the beliefs but also states or implies that
these normative values, emotions, or desires influence behavior. As I said
previously, the commitment model works only because the deviant
behavior of subgroup members shows contempt for the dominant group." °
This emotion apparently causes dominant group members to incur the cost
of shunning subgroup members, even though the latter may have low
discount rates. Similarly, Posner suggests that religious beliefs cause people
to forego membership in one community-despite the costs-and seek out
"like-minded" others.20 ' Good types who believed that McCarthy was bad
for the country refused to send patriotic signals (by shunning
Communists)-despite the costs-though other good types did send the
signals.20 2 Whether people will obey the law without fear of punishment
depends on whether they think the behavior the law punishes is "bad." 
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The most striking example concerns race discrimination. Posner states:
A "taste" to avoid minorities is widely considered morally wrong
in a way that is different from a taste to avoid goods of various
sorts, or even a "taste" to avoid unattractive people. This is a
sociological fact that any theory of discriminatory behavior ought
to explain. The signaling theory suggests why these attitudes are
treated differently: [A]voiding a person in order to signal one's
193. POSNER, supra note 8, at 101.
194. Id. at 114.
195. Id. at 102.
196. Id. at 29.
197. Id. at 119.
198. Id. at 121.
199. Id. at 111.
200. See supra text accompanying note 65.
201. POSNER, supra note 8, at 101.
202. Id. at 114-15.
203. Id. at 111. Similarly, Posner writes:
We do not envy the [hypothetical] Pampered Prisoner [who is utterly free of social
pressure], and the reason is that much of our sense of accomplishment and well-being
comes from our considered approval or rejection of the values to which others expect
us to conform, and from our consistent action with these judgments despite the




commitment to others is to use him as a means to an end; avoiding
a person simply because one is not attracted to that person is not to
do this. This point tracks an influential distinction in moral
philosophy.2 04
Apparently, the normative commitment not to use another person merely as
an end (one version of Kant's categorical imperative!) causes people to
view race discrimination differently from other personal inclinations.
Posner does not explicitly state that this attitude influences behavior, but
presumably it does, because he says it "is a sociological fact that any theory
of discriminatory behavior ought to explain." 20
As these references show, Posner does not ignore the interior life as
relentlessly as he intends. In some ways this is a good thing, because it
allows Posner to make his application chapters far more interesting and
realistic than they would be if he ignored every motivation besides the
signaling of discount rates (and commitment to a subgroup) as a means of
acquiring cooperative opportunities. But the fact that normative influences
creep into the applications robs his theory of some of its purported
simplicity. That these influences appear in an ad hoc rather than systematic
manner undermines the predictability of the analysis. Above all, these
examples show that Posner is not denying that normative motivations exist
or that they influence behavior. He is just denying these motivations any
formal role in his theory of norms.
This struck me as such an odd position to take-that normative
motivations affect behavior but need not be incorporated into a norms
model-that I considered interpreting Posner in a different way. There are
times when his theory seems to make room for moral commitments or
beliefs, when normative motivations might be used to constrain what can be
a signal. For example, when explaining the harassment ritual known as
"charivari," which sanctioned individuals for violating marriage norms,
Posner says, "One signal of reliability is participation in (costly) nonlegal
punishment of deviants who threaten or appear to threaten the
community." 20 6 If enforcement really depends upon the deviants
"threaten[ing] or appear[ing] to threaten the community," then perhaps
Posner is saying, as an essential part of the explanation, that the charivari
participants morally disapproved of what the deviant did. When Posner
204. Id. at 140 (emphasis added).
205. Id. (emphasis added). Perhaps he means that what people say-that discrimination is
wrong-is their behavior, just as Posner thinks it important to explain why people say their values
are incommensurable even though (he says) they are not. But then the interesting point is that here
Posner uses an actual normative position-that discrimination is wrong-to explain why people
say it is wrong. Given that what people say can affect their payoffs, the implication is that their
normative beliefs can affect the costs they are willing to incur.
206. Id. at 76.
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explains why third parties punish parents of illegitimate children, we see
this possibility again:
Community members are always looking for ways to signal their
loyalty to each other. Actions which are unusual or that pose a
threat to the community present an opportunity to demonstrate
loyalty. Households with illegitimate children present such a
signaling opportunity, either because they violate a statistical
norm... or because they result in unsupported children that
become a burden for the community." 7
To punish a statistical outlier entails no normative belief."8 But when
Posner mentions punishing those who "burden" the community, maybe he
is suggesting the role for a belief that parents of illegitimate children are
bad.
Ultimately, I cannot sustain this reading of Law and Social Nonns.2'"
Posner clearly intends to omit the interior life, to avoid relying on values,
emotion, or a desire for approval. Despite occasional lapses, he wants his
theory to be capable of explaining social norms, at least the many he
discusses, without making any assumption of normative motivations. He
explains numerous behaviors without any reference to such motivations and
says nothing to indicate that those explanations are the exceptional ones.210
Posner even suggests at one point that individuals "disapprove" of a
behavior because it signals a high discount rate.2" ' The implication is that
normative judgments, even where they exist, merely follow the signaling
analysis. Thus, despite the way normative motivations slip into his analysis,
the signaling and commitment models seek to avoid such motivations while
explaining norms.
207. Id. at 83 (emphasis added).
208. When Posner first introduces the idea, he says the shunning initially arises when "no
moral significance [is] attached" to the unusual practice. Id. at 25.
209. Even if I could, the problem would then be Posner's failure to identify systematically
when these motivations run out and signaling becomes a necessary explanation.
210. For example, when Posner describes why people take the "time and effort" to shame
criminals-ordinarily thought to be an act involving normative motivations-he says, "[S]haming
a person is usually understood as a signal by the speaker that he belongs to the good type.... An
individual might fear that if he does not engage in an act of public shaming, people may believe
that the signal is too costly for him." POSNER, supra note 8, at 90; see also id. at 123 ("The
motive for voting, on this theory, is not to satisfy some taste for voting, or for expressing one's
views, or even for helping one's country, but to obtain cooperative returns from other private
actors." ).
211. See id. at 123 ("In the United States many people disapprove of those who do not vote
and who admit it. This reaction... follows from the signaling model: [Tihe disapproval expresses
people's view that you may not be a trustworthy person."); id. at 124 ("Under the signaling




B. The Relevance of Normative Motivations to an Understanding of Norms
So I think we are left with the implicit claim that normative
motivations, though real, are unrelated to the behavior we call norms. I call
it a "claim" because I see no difference between saying that we can explain
norms without normative motivations and saying that normative
motivations do not contribute to the behavior we call norms. Again, I can
understand how one can deny the significance of a particular type of
normative motivation, but only by giving more weight to another. Yet any
one of them will inevitably produce norms. If internalized values motivate
behavior, then when people have similar values-some occurrence of
which is statistically inevitable, especially because they can sort into
groups-they will have similar behavior. If moralistic emotions motivate
behavior, some people will share common emotional tendencies, like
getting angry at having their expectations frustrated. The similarity of
emotions and expectations will produce similarities of behavior. If people
value the esteem of others-if A's normative beliefs can motivate B's
behavior-then a pattern of approval or disapproval can produce a pattern
of behavior. In each case, the normative premise leads, on any plausible set
of assumptions, to a behavioral regularity; this is a norm.
Indeed, in each case, signaling theory reveals yet another means by
which any form of normative motivation would produce a norm. People
may wish to signal their values, emotions, or beliefs rather than their
discount rates. For example, recall that Posner briefly acknowledges that
people hold religious beliefs that can motivate their behavior.2"2 How then
should we explain costly religious behaviors like fasting, keeping vows of
poverty, and going on religious pilgrimages, as well as more dangerous
behavior like snake-handling, rejecting modem medicine, or defying a
totalitarian state on religious matters? Perhaps we can do so by saying that
religious people sometimes wish to signal their beliefs. Suppose that "true
believers," being motivated by their beliefs, want to detect the "fakers"
and associate only with each other. Religious sacrifice might be a good
means of distinguishing true from false believers as long as the true
believers are more willing to incur earthly costs (genuinely expecting
heavenly reward) than are the nonbelievers. Even among people with
equivalent discount rates, the costly behavior signals religious
commitment.2"3
212. Id. at 101.
213. We can make the same point about group loyalty and norm entrepreneurs who
encourage such loyalty. We could imagine that people have normative beliefs justifying their
loyalty to a group, that these beliefs motivate the loyalty to some degree, and that behavior is
designed to signal these beliefs. People who actually believe racist or nationalist ideology may be
more reliable cooperators with members of the same race or nation because they cannot tolerate,
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To summarize: If one concedes that some type of normative motivation
exists-and Posner does-then it seems inevitable that this motivation will
produce a norm. Certainly it would require an explanation to see how
religious beliefs are not a significant part of religious norms, how normative
evaluations of pornography or illegitimacy or voting do not contribute to
the norms that govern these things, how moralistic justifications for
patriotism or the traditional family do not influence patriotic behavior or
child-rearing arrangements, or how ideological rationalizations for sexism
and racism do not influence norms of interracial dating. To paraphrase
Posner: Normative motivations are a sociological fact that any theory of
norms needs to explain.214
At this point, some economically oriented thinkers might respond by
saying that I am merely attacking the plausibility of Posner's assumptions
and that, following Milton Friedman,215 we should be indifferent to the
plausibility of assumptions and care instead about how well the theory
predicts behavior. There is something to be said for Friedman's view.
Certainly we should stand ready to allow superior empirical evidence to
displace our familiar and comfortable intuitions about the world. Were we
presented with a statistically rigorous account of a signaling model that
explained some particular norm without reference to the normative
motivations of the individuals involved, then I would not care so much
about whether the assumptions seemed plausible. Posner, however, does not
even purport to subject his theory to this sort of empirical test. I think this is
entirely appropriate because he is engaged in hypothesis-building rather
than hypothesis-testing."6 But it is then not possible to say that the
signaling model explains more of the observed variance in norm
compliance than alternative theories that incorporate normative beliefs.
When the predictive power is not known sufficiently to be compared, I
think it entirely appropriate to count the plausibility of assumptions in favor
of a theory and the implausibility against it.
217
ideologically or emotionally, cooperating with anyone else. Signaling the ideology or emotion
may be cheaper for people who actually hold it.
214. Cf POSNER, supra note 8, at 140.
215. MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE
ECONOMICS 3, 14-16 (1953).
216. As is my own work on norms. MeAdams, supra note 10.
217. The same point applies to Posner's criticism of theories, like my own, that make what he
calls a "strong assumption" about preferences. Like others, I do not merely posit that individuals
have a particular preference: I argue for that proposition as a fact. Id. at 355-57. Absent a
breakthrough in predictive power, I do not see the methodological gain that accrues merely
because one assumes fewer preferences, if the preferences being eliminated are well-supported by
introspection and external evidence. If eliminating preferences, by itself, were a methodological
improvement, then we should say that no one gains intrinsic pleasure from reading novels (or
scores of other obviously pleasurable activities) because, given the right assumptions, it is
possible to explain novel reading by signaling alone.
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Posner's ultimate defense of his reductionism is that we do not have a
good theory to explain the things he leaves out. Regarding internalization,
for example, he says that "no well-developed theory of guilt allows us to
make predictions about when" guilt will influence behavior or "what kinds
of people feel guilt and what kinds of people do not. So if we
observe... that some people litter but others do not, we cannot rely on a
theory of guilt for an explanation." ' That may be true. In my own work,
instead of guilt, I have used patterns of external approval and disapproval
(in the broad sense described above) to explain the origin and operation of
norms.2"9 But I have only a little to say about where the patterns of approval
and disapproval come from, certainly nothing that allows strong
predictions. To me, however, this seems not so different and certainly no
worse than the degrees of freedom in the signaling theory. Recall the
falsifiability discussion from above: Posner repeatedly explains a norm by
saying that one arbitrary behavior among many happened to emerge as the
signal because of the successful endorsement by one norm entrepreneur
among many. But he gives us no way to predict which entrepreneur will
succeed, nor any reason to think we may have a predictive account anytime
soon.22 Even if we have no good way of predicting normative beliefs, if we
also have no good way of predicting the success of norm entrepreneurs,
then we do not gain anything by the reductionism that replaces the former
uncertainty with the latter. Normative motivations are familiar to us by
introspection; much of social science is devoted to their study. However
difficult it is to explain them, we are not actually simplifying norms theory
by replacing them with speculation about norm entrepreneurs.
V. CONCLUSION
Rational choice theorists seek to explain social norms as the product of
individual strategic decisions. Where some theorists assume that these
decisions are influenced by some sort of normative motivation, the
innovation in Law and Social Norms is to set aside the interior life and to
explain norms as arising from the need to attract cooperative partners in the
iterated version of the prisoner's dilemma game. Each individual wants to
signal a low discount rate, some costly behavior becomes known as the
means of demonstrating a low discount rate, and the resulting behavioral
regularity-a "norm" -is merely the equilibrium outcome of the signaling
game. Any of an infinite number of costly and observable behaviors could
suffice to signal discount rates. In Posner's theory, norms typically arise
218. POSNER, supra note 8, at 43.
219. McAdams, supra note 10, at 358-60.
220. See supra Section I.A.
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because a norm entrepreneur, also free from normative motivations,
prevails over other norm entrepreneurs in making most others believe that a
particular behavior will signal a low discount rate.
Posner's thesis is boldly inventive, but, I have argued, the discount-rate
signaling model does not work well as a general explanation of norms.
First, it is difficult to test or falsify the signaling explanation of any
particular norm, because it depends so heavily on the unexplained outcome
of the norm entrepreneur game. Virtually any behavior could be a signal,
and all we are told of the difference between the behaviors that become
signals and the behaviors that do not, is that sometimes norm entrepreneurs
succeed in creating the necessary beliefs and sometimes they do not.
Second, the model fails to consider the relevance of concealed cheating,
which means that an individual will not always prefer interacting with the
one who has the lowest discount rate. The returns to signaling a low
discount rate will be negative when an individual fears those who invest in
concealment more than those who cheat impulsively. Third, applied
generally, the model implausibly implies that norms would be weak in
small, stable, and integrated communities; that the elderly would tend not to
obey social norms; and that people would never volunteer information that
revealed their discounting of the future. Fourth, the theory overestimates the
importance of signaling given alternative means of gaining cooperative
opportunities. Because signaling discount rates is so much noisier than
direct efforts to establish a cooperative reputation, it is unlikely that, in
equilibrium, people would invest sufficiently in signaling to produce all the
norms that Posner wishes to explain. Finally, the signaling model
implausibly excludes from the formal analysis any sort of normative
motivation-internalized values, moralistic emotions, or a desire for
approval-even though Posner concedes that these motives exist and
invokes them on occasion to explain particular behaviors.
Notwithstanding my criticisms, I find Law and Social Norms to be an
interesting and enlightening book. It succeeds in at least two ways. First,
when Posner discusses substantive topics-such as gift-giving, shame
sanctions, welfare stigmatization, and family law-he often ventures away
from the primary model and provides remarkable insight into the ways that
law and norms interact. Much of these chapters stand on their own because,
though signaling remains the central theme, the analysis is frequently
independent of the exact source of the norm. No doubt these chapters will
influence legal theory even among those who do not accept all of Posner's
premises about norms. Second, whatever the flaws of discount-rate
signaling as a general model of norms, Law and Social Norms certainly
proves the lesser claim that signaling is an important component of social
behavior, necessary to a broad understanding of norms. Anyone interested
in social norms should value Posner's theory because it will sometimes be
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the best explanation, as I think it is for norms of gift-giving. In addition,
although Posner is not interested in developing this line, his book is
suggestive of how signaling of things other than discount rates may lie
behind social behavior. If normative motivations matter, then people may
have reason to signal their values, emotions, or beliefs.

